You can’t win without taking risks, Mr. Clark
NATO chief criticized for delay in starting the ground war. The “Washington Post” criticizes the general for indecisiveness
NATO chief criticized for delay in starting the ground war
You can’t win without taking risks, Mr. Clark
The “Washington Post” criticizes the general for indecisiveness
page 15
The war is won on the ground
Following several signals from Belgrade concerning its acceptance of the G8’s conditions, a degree of optimism is being observed in international political circles, including NATO, regarding what could be called Millosheviç’s surrender.
Although breaking the Belgrade dictator is an undeniable success of the bombing campaign that began more than two months ago, to be realistic, it must be said that this could be called a belated success. This is solely because of the way the campaign against the Belgrade regime proceeded. In fact, some calculations proved wrong, and so we ended up in a war that lasted much longer than had been anticipated, with material damage and loss of life, the main victims being the Albanians. For example, assuming that the Belgrade dictator would surrender easily, the bombing initially had low intensity and the range of targets was far too narrow. Had some strategically important sites that were not strictly military in nature—for instance, the energy system—been bombed in the first few days, Millosheviç would have withdrawn long ago, preventing the massacres and the mass expulsion of Albanians from their lands, which is still continuing today. But the main reason for the delay in the results of NATO’s campaign is directly connected to the reluctance to support the war on the ground. This is also the crux of the Pentagon generals’ campaign of criticism against Clark. Indeed, by conducting the war only from the air, it can be said that on the ground Millosheviç has done whatever he wanted. The most concrete illustration is the waves of expelled Albanians, the people massacred, and the mass graves that we continue to see every night. Thus, air warfare alone, it seems, is not enough for NATO to achieve the main objective for which the campaign began: stopping the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo’s Albanians. Besides this, by relegating a ground intervention to a secondary role or adapting it, the fate of the war’s outcome was, more or less, on the ground, the fate of the war’s outcome was, more or less, on the ground, the fate of the war’s outcome was, more or less, on the ground, the fate of the war’s outcome was, more or less, on the ground, the fate of the war’s outcome was, more or less, on the ground, the fate of the war’s outcome was, more or less, on the ground, the fate of the war’s outcome was, more or less, on the ground. [damaged passage/uncertain reading] But, being experienced, he is aware of this. But, from the very beginning of planning the operation against Yugoslavia and throughout its implementation, he has been continually at the mercy of politics, not to say its slave. The truth is that every military step awaited political decisions, which had to be reached by consensus. And the positions of certain politicians known for their sympathies toward Belgrade—and also linked to financial interests—have often been influential here; they oppose a ground attack, even though this is the only means of achieving a true victory. Even today, if Millosheviç’s withdrawal is being discussed, it is connected less with the effect of bombs from the air than with reports from Washington and London about a drastic increase in troops along the borders with Kosovo. According to military strategists, a war is considered won only where a soldier’s foot has set down.
This is what wins the war
Today, among other things, in “Koha Jonë” you will read:
The government beyond parliamentary control
page 3
Customs offices blocked. Customs officers angered by the new code
page 2
Meidani and Majko quit smoking. Yesterday was World No Tobacco Day
page 7
Five new minorities emerge
page 8
The PS leadership meeting ends after midnight. Socialists demonstrate their incompetence
page 2
The iceberg of the grand politics of the Kosovo issue, by Shkëndër Drini
pages 18–17
Serbs attack Kukës with heavy artillery
page 13
Private banks lower interest rates on loans
page 21
PD moderators go down to the grassroots
page 4
The national team’s footballers gather in Linzë
page 25