From President Berisha’s visit to Turkey During the continuation of his two-day official visit to Turkey, President of the Republic Sali Berisha held a press conference attended by journalists from Turkey’s leading media outlets. President Berisha addressed two main issues at the press conference: the level of bilateral relations between Albania and Turkey, which the President described as being at the highest level, and the problems of the crisis in the Balkan region. Speaking about this issue, the President emphasized that there can be no solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia without a just resolution of the Kosovo problem. The President called for the level of Turkish investment in Albania to match the level of political relations. Afterwards, President of Turkey Sulejman Demirel hosted a luncheon in honor of President Berisha. After the official ceremony, President Berisha went to Istanbul. Yesterday afternoon, the President returned to his homeland.

With this article I am expressing some of my own views and trying to encourage various people, especially economists, to write and express their views on this problem. The article is personal in nature; I am putting myself in the position of a specialist, not a minister. I repeat once again that views and other ways of solving this very important problem of reform should be put forward. Discussion of this issue is necessary in order to find the most optimal path. Three months ago, the President of the Republic, Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha, convened a broader group of specialists and officials to give impetus to the work in this direction. So far, few constructive opinions have been offered in the press or in writing on privatization through securities in Albania, or on privatization in general. Some specialists involved in politics have contented themselves with criticizing the path chosen by the Government, without being able to offer concrete alternative solutions. I will try to address some issues concerning privatization through securities, setting out positions taken by various countries on each of them and proposing the solution that, in my view, should be adopted in Albania. I have tried to determine the “solution” in light of the situation in our country (the state of the central and district-level public administration, the level of computerization, communications and transport links, and so on), as well as in light of our mentality. In the case of our economic reform, I would call the optimal solution the one that meets these criteria: a. Rapid privatization b. Social justice in the implementation of the Democratic Party’s program on privatization. c. Transparency and simplicity in implementation I have considered criteria such as increasing revenue from privatization, etc., to be secondary for the time being. The transfer of ownership from the state to private hands will necessarily and automatically bring an end to destruction, economic development and the country’s progress, and the restructuring of the economy. All of these are gains far greater than the delayed sale for “five lekë” of the state’s wealth. (Continued on page 2)

-Mr. Pjeter Arbnori received the delegation of the Council of Europe’s AD HOC Commission- The Speaker of the Presidium of the People’s Assembly, Europe’s AD HOC Commission, led by Lord Finsberg, Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly. In his welcoming speech, Mr. Arbnori said that we are pleased to welcome friends from Europe and the world, because in the past Albania was closed off from the democratic world. We want foreigners to see for themselves both the good and the bad, what has been done and what has not been done during these two years of democracy in Albania. We do indeed face difficulties, Mr. Arbnori continued, but we are convinced that we are moving forward, even though the thorns of the past get in our way. He stressed that the maturity of the Albanian people is evident in the fact that our path, both here in Albania and in Kosovo, has been free of violence and bloodshed. The stance of former political prisoners, who were numerous among us and who sought not revenge but justice from the state under the rule of law, also contributed to this. Mr. Arbnori then outlined the social and economic transformations brought about through reforms in all fields, as well as the structure and functioning of the Assembly, which has played and continues to play an important role in creating legislation that meets European and international standards. In his speech, Mr. Finsberg emphasized that the purpose of our visit is to form a clear and accurate picture of the changes and progress of democratic processes in Albania. We believe that the meetings we will hold will give us the opportunity to obtain accurate information. We want, he continued, Albania to move forward confidently on the democratic path and take its place in the Council of Europe. PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY

-N.Dokle is forced to admit that the past cannot even be compared with the present, and that Albania should join the Council of Europe -The three PS leaders struggle to answer the questions put to them by journalists, even though none of the journalists asking questions were from “RD” From the PS press conference Something had changed this time in the press conferences that PS usually holds at its headquarters—even in their format. The previous day, a meeting of the PS leadership had been held, and although all three PS leaders, N. Dokle, B. Zeneli and S. Pellumbi, took care at the conference to show that their convictions were firm and clear, it was evident that the leadership meeting had not clarified every point. The press conference began with the reading of a statement by the PS leadership. It hardly needs mentioning that the statement used the same terms about violations of rights or Nano’s unjust punishment, dictatorship, new elections, and so on and so forth. The statement also did not forget to mention the phantom petitions for Nano’s release or the “numerous” protests by international institutions. In any case, it was a statement by the PS leadership, and to take it seriously one would have to be an abnormal person. To prove this, it is enough to quote another phrase from the statement: “...the Nano issue is a purely political matter, concocted ... with the aim of liquidating the PS and, after it, the opposition as a whole.” So, by sentencing the former communist prime minister Nano, not only the PS but the entire opposition is being brought down, and the most amusing thing is that this is supposedly the PD’s aim. Such a statement is ridiculously over the top. Even the most naïve person understands that the PD could not even think of eliminating the opposition, even if it were to pretend to do so just for the eyes of the world—quite apart from the fact that it was the PD that brought pluralism to Albania. If the PD were to act as the PS leaders claim, it would first of all bring about its own isolation. Thus, even from the narrowest perspective of self-interest, it is clear how absurd propaganda based on such theses is. Nevertheless, as I mentioned above, statements of this kind should not be taken seriously. One cannot take seriously a statement that speaks of “a nationwide popular demand for early elections.” So, according to them, the whole people are demanding early elections, and only the President, 20 ministers and the Chairman of the PD disagree. That is what happens when you dream, and mistake their caps—long since retired from the State Security service—for the whole people. But the statement does not end there. “...we cannot achieve freedom and true democracy without releasing F. Nano and the prisoners (Continued on page 4)

On Tuesday afternoon at the headquarters of the DP of Albania, DP chairman Mr. Eduard Selami met with the chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, Mr. Zef Bushati. The interlocutors exchanged views and opinions on the political and economic situation in the country, the progress of reforms, etc. Relations between the two parties were also assessed, and the possibility of further strengthening them was discussed. Press and Information Department, DP of Albania

The period of 1989–’90 was more than a test in this respect, a period in which people’s characters would be sorted out; his dealings with A.Alia and the dubious Italian company Levante-Co over emergency aid. With these three acts, he managed [to] challenge his rivals, not with delegates’ votes, but with Alia’s votes, and was elected chairman of the PPSH, a post that gave him more immunity than a minister. Thus, 24 hours later, he gave up his place in the government to one of his own, a trusted man, Y.Qabiri. Alongside Nano, Alia rewarded Dokle for “competing” as a candidate, chose S.Pellumbi from N.Hoxha’s elite, and from the “strong-arm” camp chose the man with a file, K.Islami, and Gramoz Ruçi, with the black file of April 2. Thus the PPSH called itself the PSH. Nano’s rise came late. More than a year later, after Alia had burned his bridges with Gjoni, Backa, Ceka and Pashko—the first two through “voting,” and the latter two by forcing them to split from the DP—the former communist president was left without support in the DP, and was therefore arrested. From that moment, the PPSH changed ownership. Nano appeared on the scene, silent. Infected by the possibility that the tricks of the past might be exposed, he changed position. He had the Socialists’ votes. He won Alia’s votes by supporting his followers. He won the Enverists’ votes by defending dictator Hoxha, even though Parliament had declared him illegal. He began an offensive against the Meksi government. The situation was very tense for four months, but he failed. Although aided unstintingly by the six MPs of the “Alliance,” half of whom were attacked in the press as collaborators of the State Security, nothing changed in relations between the PS and the DP. On the contrary, instead of weakening the DP, the PS offensive strengthened it and renewed the energy of DP members. And it was precisely at that time that the Italian justice system dealt Nano its final, crushing blow. In Italy, his two political partners, and perhaps more, Craxi and De Michelis, were under investigation, while from Tirana his closest friend and Nano’s coordinator with Permolien, T.Kardili, left him. Thus Nano began to feel alone. His last friend was H.Sejdia, who was sent to Switzerland in handcuffs. Without friends or companions, Nano had two hopes: that his political cult would be cultivated, and, secondly, that witnesses would remain silent. Thus A.Alia disappeared. P.Ajazi did too. With only one hope left, political capitulation, Nano decided to enter a life-or-death game. He forced Islam to make demands, brought Dokle and Agolli, Tozaj and PAD, Beqir and Hoti onto the scene, but still felt spent. Under these conditions, he learned that the State Control material file exposing his dirty dealings was being closed. Then he launched political attacks. Rallies, strikes, demonstrations, walking out of Parliament. But by July 30, ’93, his [unclear] felt finished. From abroad, his only Italian friend, Alessio, whispered a political [unclear] that soon became [unclear]. Meanwhile, in But after ’90, R.Alia refreshed his entourage with young people who had proved themselves. The most prominent of all was Fatos Nano, the economist who, during the 12 months of his rule in government, tried out two economic systems and inevitably failed at both. Nano’s emergence from the iron dynasty of the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies was a warning to old Çarçani, whose only power as prime minister was the power he exercised over the protocols of meetings shown on RTV. Nano, champion of the policy of self-management, devoted himself at any cost to his own ambition for power. To achieve this, he had two paths: either remain loyal to R.Alia or move to the reformist wing of the PPSH. Naturally, he chose the first path, a choice he had settled on from the moment Alia, with his sole communist authority, removed half the old caste from positions of power. Alia had prepared the suit. Having plunged into economic debates, serving as deputy prime minister and as Alia’s personal friend, he found the moment after 20 February to lead Alia’s first government of associates. His first act as prime minister was to close the country’s only national universities. His second act was to grant H. Sejdini special status, in accordance with the agreement with Alia. His third act was to win Alia’s trust more convincingly than his rivals Dede, Gjoni and Backa. Rivalry requires partners, and Nano found them with Alia’s help. Ceka and Pashko in the PD, Islami and Ruçi in the PP, were enough for him to get through the electoral phase, and with the unstinting help of Ceka’s personal friend, I. Koçollari, he managed to control the “dirty files,” which he used in June ’91 to select the PPSH leadership. Drawn into the game with A. Alia and his father, Nano saw a political career as the only solution, one which ultimately gave him civic immunity. Convinced that he had found exactly the person he needed, and that he would naturally be easier to control, Alia opened the doors of public recognition to him. Twice within a month he entrusted him with the government, while in the government of stability he personally insisted on giving him the post of minister for relations with foreign countries. An act which, ultimately, secured their questionable connections abroad. At that time Nano travelled often to Italy and returned to Albania even more often; taking advantage of the Alia–Nano connections, he got to pose on TV whenever he pleased, so much so that he even outshone the Albanian president himself. Alia did everything possible to remove Nano from the second government, but after the reward of being re-elected president, it was easier for him to take control of the PPSH. The 10th Congress of the PPSH shows this. From being a political adolescent just five months earlier, Nano politics, the relationship between ambition and foresight, and the criteria for the new element in public life were being shaped. removed half the old caste from positions of power. Then Nano prepared his earlier, Nano challenged gave him more immunity than a ministerial position. government to one of his own, a highly the “strong-arm” faction chose the man with a file, K.Islami, and the man with the black file from 2 April, Gramoz Ruçi. Thus the PPSH became the PSH. Nano’s triumph burned the Gjoni, Backa, Ceka and Pashko cards—the them to split from the PD—the former communist president was left without support in the PD, and was arrested. From that moment, the PPSH changed owners. that the tricks of his past might be exposed, he changed sides. He already had the socialist won the Enverists’ votes by defending the dictator Hoxha, even though parliament had voted him out of legality. (Continued on page 4)

NATIONAL LIBRARY TIRANA

From the People’s Assembly AFTER 50 YEARS—ALBANIA HAS A LAW ON HIGHER EDUCATION —The academic, administrative and financial autonomy necessary for higher education institutions is enshrined— • After it was discussed at the republic’s higher education institutions, the Parliamentary Committee on Education and Social Affairs • also discussed it several times in its meetings, making mostly technical observations and stripping it of the burden of communist committees, the draft law “On Higher Education in the Republic of Albania” finally came before the People’s Assembly yesterday morning for discussion and approval; the debate concluded in the afternoon session with its final approval. Drafted on the basis of a study of and efforts to draw on the relevant legislation of several countries, such as France, Denmark, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Turkey and Greece, and with the assistance of the European Community and advice from its experts Dr. Fischer-Appelt and Dr. George Papadopoulos, 1 (Continued on page 4)