04/10/1998
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Gazeta Shqiptare

4 October 1998

The State: You will pay to keep the police officers

Law ready: Every Albanian, 500 lekë a month. Traders, double that TIRANA - The Albanian tax system has invented[?] a new tax, one for the police. From now on, all employed people as well as all private and public entities will pay a new tax, intended to raise police officers’ salaries. The annual proceeds from this tax are expected to amount to 2.5 billion lekë, which will be divided among Albania’s 12,000 police employees, official sources at the Ministry of Finance confirm. 500 lekë a month will be deducted from every employed person’s salary. All entities liable for VAT, meanwhile, will have a much higher obligation. Public entities will pay 10,000 lekë a month, while private ones will pay 5,000 lekë. Annual tax revenues in the state budget are estimated at 85 billion lekë. Under these circumstances, the addition of a further 2.5 billion lekë to the tax burden, earmarked for an increase in police employees’ salaries, is expected to have significant effects on the tax system. On page 3

The appeal of 40 orphans: Without help, they turned to prostitution

On page 7 The appeal of 40 orphans: Without help, they turned to prostitution

Brokaj: Nano left the Government in order to leave the Party too

INTERVIEW On page 2

Nano took the armored Benz[?] cars himself

The exchange of offices has begun TIRANA—Nano seems to have left nothing for those who replaced him. Not even the two armored “Benz” cars, which had been given to him when he was Prime Minister. Majko has been forced to use the car that Fino had. Even Nano’s office has not been inherited by any of the Government leaders. Majko has taken Fino’s office. Meta, meanwhile, has inherited not only the post but also the office of his predecessor in government, Kastriot Islami. Nano’s office is now abandoned. Majko has moved into the office used by Fino, which has traditionally been the office of Albanian prime ministers. The former Prime Minister of the Government of National Reconciliation kept the same office he had, while a different space was created for Nano on the second floor of the Prime Minister’s Office building. The Minister of Information, Musa Ulqini, has also moved into this building. His office is the one previously occupied by the Minister of Economic Cooperation, Ermelinda Meksi, who moved to the building where the department of her ministry is located, behind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first two working days of the Government leaders have also involved restoring their workplaces to normal. Computers, fax machines, and almost everything else needed for even the most basic office were missing. On the first floor of the Prime Minister’s Office building, the debris from the attack of 14 September remains, when almost everything was burned and looted. To reach their offices, the Government leaders have to walk through corridors marked by bullet holes.

A coup or a scam against the shattered state

“The bandits killed and robbed, the bandits attacked the state, the bandits burned it, looted it, stole from it, and laid Albania to waste...” As time passes and the heated analyses and statements, hasty conclusions and labels, demands and empty philosophizing, unfounded comparisons and analogies come to an end, one sees more clearly and calmly and asks oneself? As time passes and the heated[?] analyses and statements, hasty conclusions and labels, demands and empty philosophizing, unfounded comparisons and analogies come to an end, one sees more clearly and calmly and asks oneself? Why and how did all this happen? One notices with astonishment that most of the phenomena that have brought us to this point are encountered again; we see them before our eyes, and yet we still do not analyze them or draw conclusions. Ylli Pango on page 11

Majko’s challenge and Nano’s recycling

ANDI BEJTJA The 30-year-old Prime Minister, Pandeli Majko, began work yesterday with meetings at the Ministry of Public Order, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defence, signaling that he would not act as a temporary or transitional prime minister, notwithstanding that his fate may be determined by political circumstances and the will of the international community. The new Albanian prime minister was extremely tough and resolute when he said that the police must open fire without warning and that the security forces must not merely protect institutions, but must go on the offensive against crime. Meanwhile, at the Ministry of Finance, Majko focused on one of the biggest scourges of Albanian society: corruption and smuggling. It is quite clear that these are the two key points in the Majko test. The Majko challenge has begun. Regardless of how long the Majko government lasts, it is very important—not only for Majko as an individual, but also for the whole country—that the government he leads succeeds. First, stabilizing public order and easing the political climate are essential to creating the conditions for a normal vote in the referendum on the Constitution. The fate of the Constitution partly depends, automatically, on Majko’s fate. If there is a crisis over the government, or people are not satisfied with his governance, this could affect the vote, since, unfortunately, Albanians not only have short memories, but this time too will vote politically rather than technically on the draft Constitution—in other words, for either the DP or the SP. On the other hand, Majko’s failure would not be seen merely as his personal failure or that of the SP, but also as the failure of the generation of 30-year-olds who have entered politics. After that, young people will not find the door so wide open for entering Albanian politics, and the process of “cleansing” politics of old parliamentarians will be even harder than it actually is. Majko’s failure could also give free rein to extremist elements on both sides, but especially within the ranks of the SP. Although Majko appears to enjoy substantial international support, the road ahead is not strewn with flowers. After a major trauma such as that of September 14, when the state nearly collapsed once again, as it had in March of last year, with 400,000 weapons still uncollected and foreign investment in the country lacking, Majko has little room to maneuver. Like Fatos Nano, he will have to lead Albania with an opposition that, just minutes after his appointment, unhesitatingly called him mentally ill and un-Albanian, and went on to accuse him of ties to socialist mafia clans. Although the DP’s main demand—that Nano be removed—was met (and five former senior officials were also released), Sali Berisha expressed the same bitterness and indicated that he would use the same methods he had used against the Nano government. It is true that Berisha’s credibility, if he continues these practices, is declining day by day, especially abroad; but, on the other hand, as in Nano’s case, his actions could contribute to Majko’s downfall. Berisha seems capable of always producing his own opposite and generating conflict. Throughout this whole affair, Albanians’ nerves will once again remain frayed and taut amid daily rallies and cries for resignation in every square in Albania. Now it can be said unequivocally that Nano’s departure will not help calm the situation. Nevertheless, does Majko have any influence over Berisha, or can he influence him to refrain from initiating a process similar to the arrest of six former DP officials—a move that seriously damaged former Prime Minister Nano’s image? All the signs suggest that neither Majko nor Nano has such influence. On the other hand, after the autumn crisis and the latest one, Albanian politics is a sack into which the justice system can put its hand and never come out empty-handed. A key issue, and a heavy burden at the same time for Majko’s government, is the investigation and punishment of the killers of the Democratic deputy and leader Azem Hajdari. Achieving this goal as soon as possible, accompanied by a transparent and exemplary trial, would significantly boost this government’s credibility and ease tensions in the Democratic camp. For Majko and his government, Albanian politics and Albanian citizens in general, it would also be crucial for those responsible for Azem Hajdari’s death to be punished in the dock before November 28, when voters go to the polls on the Constitution, thereby reducing some of the excessive political tensions. For all this, Majko needs the help of the former Albanian prime minister, who still remains the number one figure among the socialists. Majko was, first and foremost, Nano’s choice, but at the same time, by resigning, the former prime minister made not only a civic gesture but, I think, also paved the way for his own comeback. Nano has an interest in the Majko government doing well, since that would be a success for the Socialist Party he leads, but Majko’s “star” shining too brightly could cause problems for Nano’s career. Nano’s relationship with Majko can be summed up in the play on words: “I love you, but I’m not in love with you.” The act of resigning and appointing a 30-year-old as prime minister are two sides of the same coin for Nano, leaving the way open for his return to power. Perhaps Majko himself understands this.

ALBANIAN NEWSPAPER, new issue in 13 DAYS

Majko’s challenge and

ANDI BEJTJA Majko’s challenge and … of the Majko government; is very important, not only for Majko as an individual, but also for all … … whether Majko has influence over these people or whether he can influence them so that they do not undertake some kind of process…

They became prostitutes differently

Today: the super crossword

On page 10

GAZETA e Tiranës The rain has overwhelmed us, no drainage system On page 5 GAZETA e Shkodrës The Palace of Culture, now with 2 directors On page 6 GAZETA e Durrësit Kosovars at the Municipality: We are dying of hunger On page 7