WHY WE HAVE NO ARMY
A LETTER TO KEKO
Vladimir Beja
Dear Mr. Keko!
As a former member of the military, I thank you for remaining committed to the Albanian army and, in particular, for taking a stand in defense of military personnel who have been left out, as part of your justified engagement as an intellectual. To be honest, I am shocked by the expression you used, that until now military personnel have been “raped” by politicians. It is deeply offensive to us in the military, although reality has been and remains as such that even without putting that word in quotation marks, you would still not be wrong.
It is accepted that in a democratic state, leadership belongs to the political and military Elite, with each side’s duties harmonized so as to ensure and preserve at all times a national defense policy, in such a way that neither side abuses the other. It is also accepted that the initial evolution of this leadership belongs to the political Elite, not the military one, because of the many merits that the latter brings when it assumes leadership on its own. But it can in no way be accepted—and has by now been condemned by everyone—that the political Elite under dictator Hoxha, with the “enemy” groups it so frequently uncovered in the miserable army, completely destroyed the military Elite, turning the Albanian army into a “guard dog” that not only would never bite, but had also lost the ability to bark.
The democratic processes and the dignified stance taken by the Albanian army amid the maelstrom of the country’s political events gave rise to hopes that the new political leadership would take a stance that was not only serious but also appreciative of the army in general and the military Elite in particular, treating it as a partner, and that together they would lead the Armed Forces toward their necessary revival, in keeping with the structures of the armies of Western countries.
...obey them, much less act against them. The real victims among military personnel are those who held leadership positions at the most critical moments, or defected to neighboring countries. Those military personnel and former personnel who actively took part in attacks on depots, the arrival of aircraft and [text unclear], as well as those who were involved in the events, openly declare themselves patriots, [text unclear] in the Army, while others who were reinstated continue to fill the Ministry of Defense. These are also the Serbian fans who were brought back to their former positions and who aim to destroy the military Elite once again.
Dear Teodor! I appreciate your very well-intentioned efforts to help reorganize the military administration professionally, but the solution you propose seems unrealistic to me—indeed, forgive me, even naïve—when you think that these problems between the political Elite (or the “political guiding heads,” as you call them) and military personnel (I am not using the term military Elite, since it does not exist today) can be solved at a table between Nano and Berisha, whom you quote: “They can jointly agree on commissioners, Police directors, as well as senior army officers... etc.” So you are asking for nothing more and nothing less than for them to create the military Elite that is so essential and desired by everyone, in order to have an army organized and sustained by the political state. But can the two supermen of today’s Albanian politics really do that?
You are concerned by the impossibility of these irreconcilable political opponents meeting and sitting down for talks. I, however, am concerned that the military Elite cannot be the product of political and party compromises, but only the product of a genuine military career. Any attempt to create it artificially will leave the conditions in place for it to be abused by its political creators. Nano and Berisha, the government and the opposition, must agree as soon as possible on drafting and approving genuine, modern legislation for military society, and every political force or grouping that comes to power must rigorously respect it. The political Elite should continue to play first fiddle in leading the army, but its powers should be limited to three leadership functions: 1. Oversight. 2. Defense policy. 3. The military budget. The other functions should be transferred to and properly administered by the General Staff, which must be separated from the Ministry of Defense apparatus and operate with greater relative independence, in the true sense of the word. These would be the first measures for creating military leadership.
The genuine military Elite has always been, and remains, a historical product of its time and of the political and social relations prevailing in society. It cannot be judged outside these conditions, and this is not a formal judgment but a functional one. That means it should not be judged on the basis of where officials, formalists, individual members, and particular circles of the Elite currently stand, but by their practical conduct, the nature of their actions, their relationship with the law, the moral aspects of their conduct, their ability to serve new social developments, etc.
1. Indervari Keko
Once again, I thank you for making the absence of a military Elite a subject of concern for you as an intellectual and a man of letters. While I acknowledge that I may be right about everything, let us leave this debate open, hoping that it will also be a lesson in wisdom for others, especially those in the army, [text unclear].
* Former Commander of the Combat Navy
… rior, but also appreciative of the military as a partner, and reorganization in the future, in line with the structures of the armies of Western countries.
The military knew that, even with the change of systems and the transition to a democratic state, they remained in their profession and special status because of their military careers, which have no causal connection with the new political and social processes. For former military personnel, the past is past, though it remains military and serves their careers; in general, it is respected by the military themselves, who do not like it when you recognize it only to obscure it and consign it to the past.
But, dear Teodor, it was not to be that things would go well this time either. The lack of a clear reform program meant that the word reform was often translated into radical purges. The forced reduction in the number of military personnel often turned into lists arriving from political groupings, which once again scattered the real Elite—the Elite that had emerged after certain measures to depoliticize and de-party the army were taken a short time earlier, with the removal from the army of commissars, secretaries and other political cadres. Many officers who had abandoned their military duties were also brought back into the army; although they had supported the Movement for Democracy, they had lost this right because they had openly declared themselves for the party. There were also attempts to artificially create a military Elite of lieutenants and captains, who were astonishingly promoted to admirals and generals?!
The year 1997, now called the year of ruin, with the total collapse of the fragile democratic institutions, could not spare the army, an institution that was entirely, and first and foremost, political and social. Although the political Elite itself was responsible for this national catastrophe as the leading force directing the army in the division of powers, it restarted its campaign against the military personnel deemed responsible for causing it, deliberately forgetting even the army as a whole, which, caught between (illegible) and other institutional bodies and sub-government structures, had to act outside them, not…