A repeat of Bosnia
BY GAVROSH LEVONJA
At the beginning of March, when the armed conflict in Kosovo had just begun, the international community, concerned about the consequences that could result from its escalation, declared pompously that it “would not allow another Bosnia to be repeated.” Besides this, despite various disagreements and a certain characteristic delay reminiscent of Bosnia, some positions and initiatives by international actors, primarily the USA, were encouraging in this regard. But developments on the ground in recent days, as Serbian forces have launched a fierce offensive against areas considered strongholds of the KLA or “liberated zones,” clearly reveal the international community’s inability to prevent Bosnia from being repeated in Kosovo. Reports of the discovery of mass graves containing the bodies of 600 Albanian civilians, most of them children, the 1,000 people killed in Rahovec, entire villages burned and destroyed, and thousands more civilians driven from their homes show that Kosovo has now become a second Bosnia. The “concerns” expressed by Western politicians “about the escalation of the crisis in Kosovo,” decisions to send observer teams, and even threats to use force against Millosheviç are merely belated actions, taken at a time when the worst has already happened. In fact, so far the actions of international actors have not gone beyond rhetoric. On the other hand, the international community was concerned less about what might happen in Kosovo than about the possibility that the conflict’s flames might cross Kosovo’s borders and spread to other countries in the region. Nevertheless, a considerable share of the blame for the tragedy unfolding in Kosovo also falls on Albanian politics, first and foremost official Albanian politics. By placing itself in the role of a loudspeaker repeating Western options and beating its chest over “unity of positions,” official Tirana throughout this whole concert has proved incapable of exerting influence on international actors. Even in the few cases of “deviation,” prompted by the opposition’s manipulative pressure, a mere “rap on the knuckles” was enough to make Albanian officials lower their voices. In this way, official Tirana has continually found itself trailing everyone, washing its hands of the matter with only some formal statement. Even now, there are no people from Albania among the observer groups heading to Kosovo. Likewise, Tirana’s inability to establish contacts with or exert influence on the KLA—which is, in fact, the only force, including among a section of the KLA, which of the KLA, at least to temper the euphoria observed on the eve of the Serbian offensive—is another cause of what Albanians are experiencing in Kosovo today.