The subject of this article was suggested to me by a slogan written on the wall of a village shop in central Tirana. Someone (and this was a mistake) had written, “The PSSH will win. The village is with us.” Another hand replaced PSSH with PD. In any case, that was not right either, because we have marred what little beauty our buildings have. Nevertheless, it is not the aesthetic aspect, but the idea behind this slogan that prompts me to think, naturally leading me to ask: “Why did the village not give its vote to the PSSH, and why will it not do so?” First: the PPSH, which had the greatest support from the village in winning the Second World War, carried out agrarian reform immediately after Liberation. It brought great joy to the mass of farmers, although the interests of the few latifundists were affected: their land was seized and they received no compensation of any kind. Instead of paying them the value of their property, the doors of the prisons were opened to them. But this reform was a tactic of that party and Enver Hoxha, who tried to deceive the farmers for a short time. Because very soon the dictatorship put forward the idea of the socialist collectivization (read: socialist destruction) of the village. Sometimes with “willingness,” sometimes directly through pressure and force, collectivization was “successfully” completed even in the mountain villages after many years. And yet the land was called the property of the group, because his successors concocted the farce of allowing the farmer to raise two lambs. He was to keep the ewe and hand over the lamb to the cooperative at a sale price set in advance. Then the idiotic idea of the PPSH was trumpeted as a success: like a tenderhearted mother, it was supposedly giving every farming family the chance to have one lamb a year. That is, up to 25–30 kg of meat a year. For a family of four, that came to a little more than two kg of meat a month. But only meat, because the ewe and lamb had to be handed over. It is hard to find a pen capable of describing the great anguish of the Albanian cooperative farmer, who was completely without land and disillusioned with the PPSH. He began to feel nothing for the land, no longer to have the love for it inherited over centuries, but to see it as belonging to the state. That is why some of the produce was “harvested” at night, because wages were miserable and, ultimately, the farmer was taking the sweat of his brow from his own land, which communism had taken from him. Some readers will say that these deeds belong to the PPSH, whereas the PS is a new party. If it really were new, the PS would not only have refrained from placing some of the former second-echelon “Neros” of the PPSH in its leadership from the outset; it also had a chance to show its true colors in the countryside. How? Very simply: when it passed the land law, during the time it had the— [text continues beyond the edge of the image] … and I believe that the village should not vote for PS candidates in the municipal and local elections. Farmers appreciate the stance of the Democratic Party, which fought to give them land so that they could become masters of their own destinies. But taking possession of the land is only one side of the matter. It is, however, the basis for the initiative to make personal gain an ideal. When I asked a farmer from Tirana, from whom I had bought onions, “Is it better now, or when you were in the cooperative?”, he replied: “Don’t even ask. When we were in the cooperative, we began to forget how to live. This year, from what I’ve sold, I managed to buy something that I couldn’t buy in 40 years in the cooperative.” And yet the task of democracy does not end with giving land to the farmer. That land needs machinery, fertilizer and irrigation. Those farmers, martyred throughout half a century, are asking for financial assistance. Of course, not everything can be achieved at once, but little by little and with a great deal of work. Fertilizer has arrived, and genuine initiatives have begun for several families or small villages to join together. Some joint ventures have also emerged. These are all just beginning. But it is a promising beginning, because today the farmer has a great incentive: to produce and sell as much as possible. The market shows this this year, and it is expected to be even better in the future. There are complaints, and there will be more; one cannot build a new state, ruined and impoverished, without difficulty and pain. Nevertheless, when the farmer goes to the ballot box, he knows that it was communism that took his land from him; it was the PPSH and the PS that drove him out of the city streets when he was selling a few onions and eggs. The farmer, all frightened, would go out hoping to earn a few lekë, while the shadow of the police appeared like a ghost and “caressed” him by taking him to the station. Whereas now… “Got produce to sell? Come on, farmer brother!” This is the welcome democracy gives him. The day will come when the farmer can take his goods to market in his own vehicle, or traders will go and buy them from him there in the fields. That is how it is in democratic countries, and not how it was in countries where the “brothers” of Albania’s communists or socialists were in power, and who never stop saying: “We have renewed ourselves…” PETRO DHIMITRI That is why, socialist collectivization (read: socialist destruction) of the countryside. Sometimes with “willingness” and sometimes directly through pressure and force; after many years, collectivization was “successfully” completed even in the mountain villages. group, because the arrangement was supposedly a voluntary union of the villagers themselves. This was a huge lie, as was later proved. As if the troubles that had befallen the peasant were not enough—he had become a day laborer for a few pennies a day, despite being native to the land of his ancestors—the cooperative yard, too, was gradually attacked. First it was reduced; later, initiatives emerged “from below” (though they were devised by the dictator’s henchmen up above) that virtually eliminated it. Not only that, but the mad idea of taking away the livestock kept in the cooperative yard also arose. The result: village homes were left without a glass of milk, a drop of buttermilk, or a spoonful of butter. In fact, the madness of Albanian communism went so far that in the villages (in many areas, this or that first secretary—read: district aga) would not even allow villagers to keep chickens?! Even after the dictator’s death, putting some of the former “cleronts” of the PPSH’s second echelon in positions of leadership, but it would also have had a chance to prove itself with regard to the countryside. How? Quite simply: when it passed the land law, while it held a majority in Parliament during the Government of Stability, it should have ordered that peasants everywhere receive the land their fathers had when they joined the cooperative. Was the cooperative the property of the group? Did the peasants themselves join it voluntarily? Then why should each person not receive the share they had contributed? Of course, some land had also been exchanged. For those few families, consideration would have been given to providing plots on the vacant land. In this way, neither the stables, nor the greenhouses, nor the other buildings would have been destroyed. And most importantly, the peasants would have believed that the PS was a new party, because it had given them the land their fathers had owned. This revealed once again the truth: it was communism that had deceived the peasants by giving them land through agrarian reform, and it was that same communism that deceitfully seized the peasants’ land from them, putting the cooperative’s name in between. That is why it did not vote on March 22

The PD must and will win the local elections as well The decision of the PD parliamentary group regarding Mr. Pashko is approved ▪ The PD must and will win the local elections as well ▪ The decision of the PD parliamentary group regarding Mr. Pashko is approved On Monday, 29 June 1992, at 10 a.m., the National Council of the PD convened in the ISTN hall in Tirana to discuss and decide on the party’s platform, objectives and duties in the elections for local government bodies, as well as Mr. Pashko’s statement in Parliament and the response to it. The meeting was opened by the chairman of the PD, Mr. Eduart Selami. At the outset, he pointed out the importance of the local elections, emphasizing that local government is the level that communicates directly and constantly with the people. He then spoke about the particular features of this campaign, the situation in which it would take place, and the old and new problems we are facing, etc. “The PD must win, and we are optimistic that we will win these elections,” Mr. Selami stressed. “But our success requires all the party’s forces to demonstrate maximum mobilization, commitment and effectiveness, urgently eliminating certain shortcomings and weaknesses that have become evident, especially after our victory in the 22 March elections. As a result, the life and activity of many sections and branches have slackened, at a time when the PS has launched a full-scale, unscrupulous frontal attack. But now that we are in power, the work of the PD has a broader meaning and reach. The work of all the other links in the chain also comes into play: the Presidency, the Government, Parliament, local government bodies, and so on. Coordination of the work at every level,” Mr. Eduart stressed, “is a decisive condition for our success and victory.” “The elections for local government bodies,” Mr. Selami continued, “are another test and opportunity for us as a party to select people and put forward those who are wisest, most honest, most worthy and most committed to their duties and to reform. This will give us the opportunity to correct some mistakes we have made by assigning responsibilities to people who do not deserve them. To achieve this, however, it is essential that we give greater and more serious consideration to the broad and mature views of the sections and branches, because it is a fact that we have not been free of subjectivism, unhealthy relationships, factions and favoritism. “Another important factor in winning these elections is carrying out intensive, committed and effective explanatory work with the people about our program, our objectives, and the sacrifices and hardships we will face during the process of implementing reforms and, generally, throughout the transition period. We,” Mr. Selami stressed, “must intelligently publicize our achievements so far in foreign policy, law and order, the resumption of production, etc., while refuting with facts the nihilistic and pessimism-inducing propaganda of the PS. The PS has absolutely no right to accuse us of failing to keep our promises. We are already delivering on some things, but our promises were made with the four years of this legislature, for which the people gave us their votes, as the time frame. We are doing everything possible, but we cannot deny that we have also made mistakes, or that some things could be done faster and more decisively. “For the cabinet, responsibility is concrete and must be demanded concretely of each person or link, because otherwise individual responsibility is concealed. “Our victory in the elections,” Mr. Selami continued, “also depends on knowing how to use and exercise power effectively for the benefit of reforms and the implementation of our program. Now that we are in power, we must resolve as quickly and fairly as possible issues such as the Shkodër trial, the trial of the arrested bloc members, and the arrest of others.” Then Dr. Prof. Sali Berisha took the floor. He emphasized the need to free ourselves from certain old ways of thinking and practices. One of these old practices is the way we communicate with people. High-quality communication with people is vital to the success of our mission. We are building a new state, a genuinely democratic society, and we must likewise create a new way of communicating with people. In this regard, it is important to make the right decisions and then explain and communicate them. This requires us to know the program and reforms well, and for the people themselves to know them, through broad, concrete and frank explanatory work. We are a party that has no files on people, and this explains some mistakes we have made in personnel policy. But we will gain greatly in the eyes of the people if we recognize and correct these mistakes ourselves, as this demonstrates realism, strength and maturity. Further on, Mr. Berisha spoke about the need to organize a frontal struggle, from above and below, against corruption, beginning first of all in the bodies whose duty it is [text continues beyond the edge of the image] (Continued on page 3)

— The director of the Korçë Grain Enterprise, Voj. Manaj, has leased out five grain warehouses without documents or rent — [text continues beyond the edge of the image]

At the time the Government of Stability was being formed, Mr. Pashko borrowed from last year; Mr. Pashko let himself (the military term “death pilot,” perhaps) be cast as the one to define the heavy burden in the political maelstrom, convinced that it had also been imposed on him in the political maelstrom with the conviction that he was taking on the great burden, along with the whole At the time the so-called Government of Stability was being formed, Mr. Pashko borrowed from last year; Mr. Pashko let himself (the military term “death pilot,” perhaps) be cast as the one to define the heavy burden in the political maelstrom, convinced that it had also been imposed on him in the political maelstrom with the conviction that he was taking on the great burden, along with the whole [text continues beyond the edge of the image] team. Really, did he have in mind only the challenges of the political, economic and social crisis, or also the other challenges he foresaw or sensed, such as economic and political corruption or the complexes of the past? How should we interpret it—as a brilliant expression or as fatalism? If he saw himself as doomed to lose, why did he agree to become a “death pilot”? Is he perhaps merely a victim of the career epidemic (a noose he willingly put around his own neck), or a pawn on a chessboard behind the scenes, where old masters of intrigue, farce and masked masquerades are playing hard? (In that case, others have thrown the noose around him.) Mr. Pashko is more a victim of careerism. His insistence on preserving the Government of Stability (more accurately, a government destabilizing the country, ensuring the stability of its ministers and fostering corruption), and his statement in Helsinki around mid-April 1992 that he saw himself as the most likely candidate for prime minister of the first democratic government, convince us that he—or his family and social circle—had lulled him into the delusion that Albania had no one more capable than him of becoming prime minister. But can we remind Mr. Pashko that, having failed miserably in the test during the Government of Stability, he had lost the right ever to claim that post? And when we consider only part of his incompetence and inability to achieve his objectives, as well as the theory of the “fact” of therapy, which served the communist-socialists and other Stalinist destabilizing forces as a platform or green light for their “scorched earth” scenario and their revolt of corruption, along with certain statements, signatures and actions he carried out, and how they served anti-personalism, the PP or PS, but not at all populism, the PD and democracy, in a populist way, the PD and democracy. With these steps Mr. Pashko proceeds—failing without realizing it—toward political disgrace, and consciously also toward the financial hierarchy of the poorest country in Europe alone. And apparently, while also making himself a “death pilot” a thousand times over… His statement in Parliament was not only reckless but also extremely naive for a doctor. He found neither the right time nor the right place. He sacrificed himself through harakiri, but “wounded” Mr. Hajdari too. How could this politician, pampered with so many superlative epithets just two years earlier, forget 2 July 1990, precisely the day the first Assembly of Kosovo convened, when the hidden or open allies of Milosheviç opened the embassies in Tirana with the aim of diverting the world’s attention from Prishtina and concentrating it on the capital? Did Mr. Pashko remember, did he recall the day when the deputies of Kosovo’s new Assembly gathered in Prishtina to judge his own folly? Let this be a reminder and a warning by analogy! We can also draw another parallel with Mr. Ceka’s statement in December of last year. The three Decembers were all in the same situation, at the same point in an election period, at the height of an economic crisis (in December of that year, and now the oil crisis), but also during the feverish propaganda campaign of PS saboteurs against the PD and democracy in general. Before taking any action, one should ask and analyze: whom does it serve? Mr. Pashko, as a profound analyst, how could he fail to make this elementary calculation? He should also have calculated who matters more, Azem Hajdari (even if he had been bloodied) or Albania. Besides, concern for Mr. Hajdari’s fate could have been expressed the next day, or a week later, when the truth had become clearer. So why did Mr. Pashko not wait? Since he emboldened the PS and the other antidemocratic forces, which immediately came to his defense (perhaps they used to attack him in order to pave the way for his credibility and career?), we have reason to think that, through his statement and his action, Mr. Pashko rendered a great service only to the PS. In this context too, did he become what he had “prophesied” himself to be, a “death pilot”? XHEVAT MUSTAFA

The director of the Korçë Grain Enterprise, Vojin Mano, has leased out five grain warehouses without documents or rent — The director of the Korçë Grain Enterprise, Vojin Mano, — The former director of the Korçë Grain Enterprise, Vojin Mano, has, from 1991 onward, leased five grain warehouses to private individuals for use as car parks without drawing up any official rental documents. The warehouses were given respectively to: the Ilia Teneqexhi enterprise; Gaqo Blushi, head of mechanics at this enterprise; the former director of the TEC, Viktor Zallëmi; and Aleko Kites. This is how Vojin Mano leased out these warehouses. He leased one to Gaqo Blushi in November–December 1991 (the exact date is unspecified) and one to Ilia Teneqexhi in January 1992, without drawing up any rental contract. All these actions were carried out without the knowledge or approval of the district branch of the privatization agency, as required by law. Forced by an inspection within the enterprise, which also conducted an inspection report in April 1992, Vojin Mano drew up (Continued on page 3)

At the time the Government of Stability was being formed, Mr. Pashko borrowed from last year. Mr. Pashko let himself (perhaps) be assigned the military term “death pilot” to define the great burden he and the whole team were taking on. Really, did he have in mind only the challenges of the political, economic and social crisis, or also the other challenges he foresaw or sensed, such as economic and political corruption or the complexes of the past? How should we interpret it—as a brilliant expression or as fatalism? If he saw himself as doomed to lose, why did he agree to become a “death pilot”? Is he perhaps merely a victim of the career epidemic (a noose he willingly put around his own neck), or a pawn on a chessboard behind the scenes, where old masters of intrigue, farce and masked masquerades are playing hard? (In that case, others have thrown the noose around him.) Mr. Pashko is more a victim of careerism. His insistence on preserving the Government of Stability (more accurately, a government destabilizing the country, ensuring the stability of its ministers and fostering corruption), and his statement in Helsinki around mid-April 1992 that he saw himself as the most likely candidate for prime minister of the first democratic government, convince us that he—or his family and social circle—had lulled him into the delusion that Albania had no one more capable than him of becoming prime minister. But can we remind Mr. Pashko that, having failed miserably in the test during the Government of Stability, he had lost the right ever to claim that post? And when we consider only part of his incompetence and inability to achieve his objectives, as well as the theory of the “fact” of therapy, which served the communist-socialists and other Stalinist destabilizing forces as a platform or green light for their “scorched earth” scenario and their revolt of corruption, along with certain statements, signatures and actions he carried out, and how they served anti-personalism, the PP or PS, but not at all populism, the PD and democracy, in a populist way, the PD and democracy. At the time the last year. Mr. Pashko let himself (perhaps) be assigned the military term “death pilot” to define the great burden he and the whole team were taking on. while also making himself 1000 “death pilot”

Letter to the editor If I did not trust you, I would not write you a single line with the thought, “What’s it to me?” But I am convinced that injustice revolts you, that you do not accept corruption, and that you fight for democracy. I formed this opinion from your articles against the dictatorship and those who brought bad days upon the people. That is why I would recommend that you write about a very important subject. Someone may have noticed (and this is why I am writing) that trucks loaded with industrial goods are periodically unloaded at the doors of the People’s Advocate’s Office. They say these belong to the “Kristal” company. What is this company, and who runs it? Large trucks? It seems to me that two former officials of the PPSH Central Committee apparatus have become some kind of adventurers, one named Shpëtim and another named Kristaq. Where did they find the dollars, when they were so unprivileged, to engage in such a business? And also—and this is important—an office on the third floor has been made available by the ZP as a warehouse for these communist businessmen? And to the question: the ZP building is a state building, so is it permissible for it to be rented out—I mean, for state property to be rented out for dollars for someone’s own account? Is this right? If the ZP has these rooms to spare, they should be made available not to Mr. Shpëtim and Company for profit—they have not had enough so far—but to those who were expelled from the prisons of the dictatorship and are now lying out on the streets. Besides, “Zëri…” also does business itself. It too has its own warehouse of goods brought from Bulgaria by the businessman—or, rather, the chief businessman and editor-in-chief, Përparim. An article about this was written and given to “Korvori SD.” But nothing has been done. Are these comrades-gentlemen so powerful that they do not care about the law? Or do they think that they make the law themselves, as they say? And why doesn’t Mr. Blerim Cela of the State Audit Office investigate this sort of abuse at the people’s expense? Have you seen that other newspapers have several rooms, while the ZP has even left its ground floor unused? It uses the upper floors as warehouses. It keeps goods for itself to sell when the time comes and rents offices—warehouses—for dollars to others. How far can this go? The sword of justice must first fall on those who have always sworn by justice and still present themselves as champions of justice, but are not. V. M., Durrës