From the government meeting To give a new impetus to economic reform, including its legal aspect, under the direction of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Aleksandër Meksi, the Council of Ministers considered and approved several important draft decisions. To establish precise and comprehensive legal regulation of the new employment relationships under the new conditions of the market economy, the law “On Collective Labour Agreements” was discussed. The other draft law discussed, “On Farmers’ Finances,” replaces the existing one, which is based on the centralized economy. The draft law “On the Plant Protection Service” also concerns the field of agriculture. At the meeting, the Council of Ministers also approved a number of draft decisions submitted by the relevant ministries. It was decided that, for the winter period, the retail price of electricity would be increased according to consumption levels, as set out in detail in this draft decision. Through approval of the draft decision “On the criteria and competent sectors and poverty in the field of standardization of quality,” a uniform quality indicator is established for assessing quality and ensuring it reaches the user. In response to the situation created by the use of adulterated alcoholic beverages, which are causing serious harm to people every day, the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the Ministry of Health, approved the relevant draft decision suspending the licences of private individuals and entities, both domestic and foreign, engaged in the production of food products, until they are equipped in accordance with the provisions of the approved draft decision.

DP The first force that made political pluralism possible Interview with the Chairman of the Democratic Party of Albania, Mr. EDUARD SELAMI Question: The DP has marked the second anniversary of its founding. Looking back, let us recall once again the role of the DP as the country’s leading political force, which gave concrete form to political pluralism in Albania. Answer: It is true that it has been two years since the first opposition party in Albania sounded the alarm, after half a century of lengthy communist dictatorship. The DP was the first force that made the creation of political pluralism in Albania possible. In the first days after the DP was formed, it was more than a party—as we have had occasion to say before; it resembled a nationwide democratic movement that began in the City of Students, with the movement of students and lecturers, and was then supported by workers in Tirana and by thousands upon thousands of people throughout Albania. Therefore, in its first days, whether on 12 December, when it was proclaimed, or on the 17th, when it was legalized, the DP was more than a party: it was a nationwide movement against dictatorship, which dreamed of a constitutional change shaped not only by internal developments but also by those taking place in the countries of Eastern Europe. Thousands welcomed this victory in Tirana, and later in Kavajë, Elbasan, Shkodër and elsewhere. This was understandable, because Albania, unlike the countries of Eastern Europe, had no conditions for organizing, since the dictatorship was so harsh that it allowed no opposition thought. I was among the first lecturers in Building 18, where I still live, to join this movement. At first, we thought it was a movement that had been very carefully prepared, that we had a well-organized group of people behind us. I think the DP played a model role as an opposition party, as one of the strongest parties in Eastern Europe— Question: How does the DP function, what are some of its structures, and how is democracy within the DP itself achieved? Answer: The DP is organized according to Western models, which was also confirmed by its acceptance as a permanent observer in the European Democratic Union. We in the DP differ from parties that held power and had a communist-style political monopoly. I think we are very far from them, and at the same time I believe it is essential for a party emerging after dictatorship, such as the DP in Albania, to have a structure that functions as democratically and effectively as possible. From the outset, we have attached great importance to our structure. We function as a party at the centre and as a party in our districts. In fact, we have branches in all the districts of Albania; in practice, we have sections in all the villages of Albania, which is one of the DP’s principal strengths. In this way, we are among the most serious parties in the political life of the post-communist dictatorships. At these levels, as a party, we hold ongoing elections, beginning with the sections and respective branches and going all the way to the DP’s day-to-day leadership and the National Council. All of this is based on the right to speak and discuss freely, on the basis of a platform and a programme approved once every two years by the DP National Congress. In this way, as the Democratic Party, we elect the Party Chairman by secret ballot, with delegates from all over Albania. We elect the DP leadership, which is its highest executive body, and every two years we also elect the National Council, which consists of 107 people. Representatives from the DP down to its branches are represented there, and they take part in the discussions of the DP National Council, which is, of course, chaired by the party chairman, the secretary and the deputy chairman; it includes 180 people, and everyone has the right to speak. Thus, the formation of the government, about which so much fuss was made, and the claim recalled by the former DP chairman and now President of the Republic, Sali Berisha, that he supposedly eliminated his rivals, who supported him, is not at all true. It is not at all arbitrary for the former DP chairman to express an opinion on a decision that was voted on by the DP National Council, from which the democratic government emerged. Nevertheless, the Socialists accuse us of using methods resembling the old party methods; in fact, this is not at all the case. This is an honest organization of the DP, and ultimately it is Parliament that decides. This is a recommendation coming from the party. Fortunately, the recommendations we have made to Parliament and the government have very rarely been rejected. That is because they have resulted from collegial discussion within the DP structures, and, naturally, in the few cases when they have been rejected, reasons have been given for why they were rejected. So I think it is very important to explain how the structure and democracy within the DP itself function. I would say that this is one of the keys to its success. Likewise, at the meeting of the National Council that you had the opportunity to follow, it was precisely these 107 people who also represent the DP parliamentary group, whose main role is, of course, to support implementation of the Party programme. Add to this the government members who come from its ranks. All three of these levels meet together, and the difference is made by the party. That is why, at the meeting of the National Council, we were no longer seen as a party in opposition, but as the leading party with a dominant parliamentary presence, from which the democratic government has emerged, and which also bears responsibility for governing and for local government. At first, after we won on 22 March, there was a very broad theoretical debate in the leadership and the National Council about what relationship the party should have with Parliament and what relationship Parliament should have with the government. We had two positions. One held that the DP should stay away from these levels and concern itself only with its own organization, then calmly await the next election campaign. The second position—the more correct one, I would say, and also the contemporary one—was that the party should carry out its activities and provide support at both these parliamentary and government levels through implementation of its programme. Fortunately, the second theory prevailed, in the sense that this does not mean that the party controls everything, as it did in the past. That would amount to saying that it covers the country’s entire political life. The party-state and the party in government are fundamentally different from one another. First, because the party-state under a dictatorship is the sole unelected force, without free elections or political pluralism; it answers to no one, centralizes everything and keeps itself alive through dictatorship. Under pluralism, there is no longer any sense in speaking of a party-state, because as long as there are free elections, it is not the parties that shape the character of a government, but the people who choose the programmes and the political forces that will implement them. So, under these conditions, we, who come from a long period of the party-state, also have a kind of democratic illusion, according to which the party should be as ... There were no conditions for organizing [it], as the dictatorship was so harsh that it allowed no dissenting where I continue to [unclear] even now, a very well-prepared movement because behind us we had a group of people who were well organized. I think the PD of the strongest parties in Eastern Europe, because it truly was an organized force that never for a moment slackened its anti-communist, anti-dictatorial drive. I think this is one of the key foundations of its success. The PD was fortunate that a group of intellectuals and representatives of the country’s social strata joined its staff; from the outset, despite their lack of experience, they managed to give the popular movement a solid foundation. I think its opposition stance was prominent from its founding, when such a solution was sought, and it grew stronger in step with the democratic movement itself. Today, looking at the PD’s aims and objectives, it seems that they were not so radical here, and I think this had to do with the PD’s ultimate goal. This depended on the changes and the situation within the country, as well as on the PD’s growth and consolidation. The PD’s own stance after March 31: a strong opposition position combined with the preservation of balance, avoiding bloodshed from a civil war—which is also what the communists sought, since they wanted to prolong their time in power. I think the result of March 31 was the best outcome of the opposition stance maintained by the PD. [unclear] and free discussion, on the basis of a platform and a program approved every two years by the PD National Assembly. In this way, we, as the Democratic Party, all over Albania. We elect the PD 107 people; the representatives, the chairmen of every branch, are automatically members of this council. Likewise, members of the leadership [are elected] from another unit belonging to the electoral group, while [members] from another unit are chosen through the Party National Assembly. Within the PD, regardless of the legends and regardless of what is said and alleged, there is only [unclear] of the movement, or not; the PD leadership has a very strict democracy that functions very seriously. By this I mean that every important decision made by the PD is not the wish of the chairman or the leadership, but comes from the PD program, approved by the National Assembly and, at the same time, by the council’s group of discussants. As we said, these 107 people are members of it. We also have another very significant example, which I cannot explain even to foreigners, because communist and neo-communist propaganda campaigns against the PD. They are truly very surprised by the way MPs or parliamentary candidates are selected in the PD, or by how we can elect the first democratic government of Albania ourselves. This method of determining candidates, who are then subject to selection by the sectio- [unclear] those who had the opportunity to help were precisely these 107 people, who also represent the PD parliamentary group, which, of course, has as one of its main priorities the support and implementation of the Party program. Add to this the government officials who come from its ranks. These three levels meet together in a joint meeting, which is naturally organized by the party. Parties have a purpose, after all. They are groups that bring together, so to speak, these levels: the parliamentarians and the executive levels of central and local government. There, the platform is discussed and opinions are exchanged, which are then presented to the party leadership and its chairman. At the same time, these are opinions that will also be put to parliament and the government. This is the safest and most direct way to carry out the PD program, because we believe that parliamentarians and government officials who come from a party whose program they voted for are obliged to implement that program; and if these levels fail to implement it, the party takes a position on all of them. Question: At the National Council, you discussed the differences between a party-state and parties in power. What problems currently arise in coordinating the work of the three levels: party, parliament and government? Answer: As you can see, the question is very important, and as you yourselves saw, we discussed It the meeting of the National Council—which you had the opportunity to help with—it was precisely these 107 people who also represented the party takes a position on all of them. In those parties in which we are [unclear], in practice the party chairman, if he wins, automatically becomes prime minister as well and directs the entire state pyramid of that country. It seems to us that if these illusory and idealistic concepts were to prevail, that would be the most flagrant example of a party-state and of party interference in the state. That is not the case. This theory is untenable so long as there are free elections; the danger of a party-state is not absolute. It is a fact that there are free elections within the party and, secondly, government and parliamentary activity is in accordance with the constitution and does not derive from the program, nor solely from the party, but from the government and a group of parliamentarians. That group is obliged to implement the program of the party that put it forward, for the very simple reason that the will of the people is the foundation of democracy. (Continued on page 4) Interviewed by: DYLEMAN KARAJ

Xhemal Dymyla and Hajredin Shyti did not accept it. They played other roles before the court, claiming that the damage was unlawful. But are the two of them unlawful? They pretend to be very naïve. They act as if they know nothing. But who were Xhemal Dymyla and Hajredin Shyti? Xhemal was first secretary of the Shkodër Party Committee and a candidate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PPSH, while Hajredin was Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. On 1 April 1991, Xhemal Dymyla was at a meeting of the Central Committee of the PP. The questions arise: Why was Xhemal summoned to the Central Committee? Who summoned him? Was a meeting held? Who chaired it? What directives were issued to the party committees in the districts? Who from the Political Bureau attended that meeting? Who among the members of the government of that time was there? Were special instructions given to Xhemal, since the situation in Shkodër was going to be very tense? When Xhemali returned to Shkodër, what order did he instruct the head of the Internal Affairs Branch, Çapajev Taçi, to convey? Why did he ask for the army to intervene in Shkodër? To suppress the movement? Xhemal had gone— (Continued on page 4)

The entire public wants to know something else: Who were the direct killers? That is, who gave the order, and who actually fired? This is natural. After the tragic killings of the four April 2 “Martyrs of Democracy,” the people have waited a long time to learn the truth. Who were the criminals? For days, the proceedings have been charged with great tension, and the role of the Shkodër Trial has been at issue. Apparently, this trial too is not going to reveal the truth. We say this because the investigation is not producing concrete evidence, and the judges, prosecutor and lawyers are not insisting strongly enough on this point. In the court hearings, there is more “empty talk”—repeated words and questions—than essential questions that would put the defendants “with their backs to the wall.” For example, it took a strong reaction from the courtroom (a gesture that, in fact, nobody approved of) for the presiding judge to persist with questions to the accused— (Continued on page 4)

For several days, citizens have been glued to their television screens, searching for the truth about April 2. The defendants in the trial read out their statements and answered questions, and in the end they found themselves confronted with the facts of the crime, the facts uncovered by the investigation and the witnesses’ testimony. It is utterly absurd to think that the accused will confess to the truth; just as it is absurd to suppose that the killing of the four martyrs took place without orders from superiors in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at both local and central levels. G. Ruçi’s own statements during his testimony, compared with his actual statements to H. Shyti, make you doubt every point of the accused party’s “sincerity.” The question is

about the telegrams. Ruci says that he signed several urgent telegrams after consulting with specialists, but that he never gave an order to launch an offensive. Immediately afterwards, he says that [unclear] what was happening in Shkodër. While saying that he ordered the disarmament of the military personnel under his command, he declares that he sent special intervention units from Tirana which, according to witnesses, were not only armed but also threatened passers-by on the way. The accused say there were no snipers that day! Can this be believed, when it is well known that the crowd was shot at with well known that the crowd was shot at with snipers that day? (Continued on page 4)

A trial between dictatorship and democracy