Mr. Chairman, Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, Whenever we discuss the democratic coalition government itself, we must keep more firmly in mind what we set out as the basis for dividing roles in the exercise of power, which we have expressed and written down since 1992 and every time since then. First of all, this issue is linked to governing a country that still bears within itself, in its entirety, all the evils of the previous regime, with the difficulties and obstacles that come both from the lack of basic conditions and from the country’s particular nature, as well as from general world problems that have their own influence in this case. The former democratic opposition, being committed in spirit to reform, change, and democracy, had in mind the necessity of implementing these reforms, and these reforms genuinely covered all of life in all its aspects: economic, political, social, and democratic. It is precisely the tragedy of undertaking this in a country moving toward the so-called democratic road that until very recently had been the most closed country in Europe, with a country where the old structure still remains alive, where the major contradictions of the past are still present, where neither the mentality nor the administrative machinery suitable for these reforms existed, that makes their progress difficult. The BIS was completely shattered from a market standpoint, closed off in terms of exchanges. Even the other Eastern countries, which had moved a step further with the private sector, [are?] entirely in such relationships, whether with the foreign market or with other elements. We were a completely exceptional country. Under such conditions it is clear that the party coming to power in a country of these dimensions, with these contradictions, being a reformist force, will necessarily encounter extraordinary difficulties. It must not be forgotten that even in other countries, despite the support they have had, reforms have been difficult: in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and elsewhere. But we have had all of this multiplied many times over. It is enough to recall the complete lack of any stable state-building tradition, the deformation of the administration, economic ruin, the absence of law and discipline, the absence of domestic capital, the lack of market experience. Therefore, any assessment of our government must start from these conditions, from this reality, not from wishes. This does not exclude criticism. On the contrary, criticism is necessary, but criticism must be built on truth, on facts, and on the aim of helping things move forward. Within this framework, we must understand that the democratic coalition government has been and remains an instrument of the transition. It cannot solve overnight the wounds inherited over decades. It can lay the foundations, open the road, create the rules, stabilize the country, and guide the process of transformation. We have taken important steps in financial stabilization, in establishing public order, in opening the economy and the country to the world, in creating a new administration, and in rebuilding relations with our international partners. These are steps whose concrete results are not always immediately visible to the public, because they take time. At the same time, it is true that we have also had shortcomings, delays, and insufficient or late decisions. This is inevitable in such conditions, but it should not become a reason to deny the overall direction of the reforms. There is no reform without cost, no change without clashes with old interests, no building of new institutions without mistakes. But there is one line that must be firmly maintained: Albania must definitively leave behind the failed model of the past and build a democratic and market economic order. Our government program for 1992-93