THE AD LEADERS — INCENDIARIES AND ARCHITECTS OF THE BLOODBATH OF JANUARY 14 IN SHKODËR
After returning from Belgrade, the AD leaders have become hysterical standard-bearers of the boycotts that were born to destabilize and turn the country back.
- By joining Milošević, they are flirting and making common cause with the leaders and youths who came from the north.
- The AD leaders, missionaries of armament, grave-diggers of the national cause.
From the very first moments of the revolt, which was merely monitored in order to be turned into what seems like a post-festum manifestation of certain circles with a very obscure and equally dangerous objective against the Democratic Party, against the president and against the determined and unequivocal policy of the majority of Albanians on the side of progress and democracy, especially after the successful bilateral talks in Bari, against the president and government of the Albanians and of Kosovo and against their freedom, the new opposition led by former communists and neo-communists openly showed its true face. Outwardly, it called the revolt a "reaction of citizens to police violence." In reality, AD initially tried to give the revolt a humiliating, anti-government and anti-state character. This was made clear from the very first statements by their spokespersons such as Fatos Lubonja and Kastriot Islami, who that same evening took care to exonerate the crowds for their vandalism and the government for the breakdown of order and the police. The next day this statement was followed up in the pages of their newspaper "Koha Jonë," on 15 January 1994. Not only did AD emerge as the inspirer, instigator and architect of the revolt and terror, but it then also became the moral and political defender of the vandalism carried out in its name, wrapping it in a thoroughly nihilistic and anti-state interpretation. From the first day, the Secretary General of the PDSH, Fatos Nano, declared that he had seen a "stubborn" government that had "set Albania on fire" and some "intellectuals" who went from Tirana to Shkodër to insult the police, but not to condemn the violence committed against the police and the state.
In the magazine of the central organ of government, "Rruga jonë" 4 (under the old conservative pseudonym), damage to the press calls for the resurrection of the terminology of class struggle and writes, among other things, that in Shkodër had erupted a revolt of the "declassed," the "newly arrived peasants," the "mountain villagers" manipulated by the "PDSH" and by "reaction." No less alarming is Fatos Nano's language at the round table of intellectuals, where he declared that the Shkodër revolt was the "manipulated act of the fanatic youths of the north." Here he dangerously approached the old language of communist propaganda, for which the north was always a source of "reaction" and "backwardness." With this language he was not only condemning a concrete event, but was also targeting an entire region, with the old undertone of regional division.
For this reason it is important to stress that a large part of AD's positions, and especially those articulated later, presented the revolt not as a matter of public order and the political responsibility of its organizers, but as an instrument to strike at the government and to relativize every act of violence committed against institutions. This is the essence of their position, which became even more evident after the return from Belgrade of its leaders.
If in the first case some of the AD protagonists tried to present themselves as moderators of calm, later developments openly revealed their real tendency: the escalation of the situation and its use as leverage for a political crisis. Thus, in successive statements and articles, leaders and publicists close to AD began to speak of a "citizen uprising," of "civil opposition" and of "disobedience" as legitimate forms of political action. In this way, real violence was covered over with civil and intellectual phraseology.
This line, clearly seen in Shkodër, is closely linked to the flirtation of some AD leaders with centers and interests that have nothing in common with the democratic future of the country. From Belgrade to the circles that dream of a weak Albania, these positions seem to have found suitable ground in an opposition that has not yet broken with its old ideological instincts.
Therefore, AD's role in these events cannot be minimized. It was not only an inspirer, but also the political architect of the climate that led to the bloodshed of January 14 in Shkodër.