Yesterday morning, invited by the International Democratic Union, IDU, the Chairman of the DPA, Mr. Eduard Selami, departed for the United States of America. PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE DPA

At the meeting he held on Thursday with the delegation of the North Atlantic Assembly, headed by the President of that Assembly, Mr. Bouvard, the Chairman of the Committee for Defence, Public Order and SHIK, Mr. Azem Hajdari, briefed him on the committee’s composition and functioning, as well as the work being done in Parliament in support of democratic reforms and the drafting of new legislation. Mr. Bouvard praised the considerable work carried out by this committee, entirely unlike that of the communist regime, which the Albanian people left behind in a state of humiliation and contempt. He then informed the meeting’s participants about the role played by the North Atlantic Assembly, which he has the honour of chairing, in the field of defence and security of member countries. -ATA-

“The Nano File” in court Yesterday, at the fourth hearing of the trial concerning the aid scandal, held in the new courthouse, the examination of witnesses began, including R.Aline. After this, aid amounting to 10 billion lire was allocated, and the list of necessary goods was drafted by Shane Korbeci. The list was prepared on 14 February 1991, according to names such as R.Alia, Sh.Korbeci and Sh.Cani. —The history of ongoing violations— The first witness called by the presiding judge was Ridvan Qarri, an employee Who was to distribute the aid? Sh. Permiola arrived in Albania on 21 January ’91 on a special plane. On the basis of a letter from F.Nano given to Sh. Korbeci, with Mr. F.Nano and a foreign [?]. Shane Korbeci, former Minister of Foreign Trade. Sh. Korbeci confirmed the list sent by Lev Co through the Prime Minister’s Office, but requested that Agroeksporti, instead of Iliria Hollding, handle distribution. At the end it says: “Please give us your opinion”. “An opinion not only did not come, but the letter was returned with a note from Sh.Cani: ‘It was discussed with Mr. F.Nano and it has been decided that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will deal with this matter’; further down, at the bottom of the note, it had again been brought to the attention of R.Alise, A.Çarçani and Bujar Kola­neci. This list was subsequently changed. By whom? Korbeci, with Mr. F.Nano and a foreign [?], some goods were available: peas in jars, fruit juice, chicken in gelatin, etc. On 7 March, Sh. Korbeci sent a letter to Sh. Cani and F.Nano which, in addition to the prepared list, stated: “According to the fax received by hand from you, we confirm the goods being sent to us by Lev Co, but we think Agroeksporti should be the forwarding agent.” Thus “It was discussed again with Mr. F.Nano and the matter was given the go-ahead”; later it was established that the confirmation of the goods had not been made by Sh. Korbeci but by S.Plaka. Regarding Lev Co’s designation for the delivery of the aid. It appears that, in the telegram sent by the State Control, he stated that he did not know Lev Co and that the wording of the note had been drawn up according to the wishes of the Italian embassy.” “We signed formally,” S.Plaka stated. Thus, these facts establish that official confirmation appointing Lev Co was made through S.Plaka’s office, “on the instructions of Mr. Fatos...”. Later, the company Lev Co requested that I. Hollding be the aid distributor, and H.Sejdi, who presented himself as an economic adviser to Lev Co. This fax from Lev Co was also sent to B. Alise. Thus, I.Hollding proposes and presents Lev Co to the Albanian government as its partner, while Lev Co presents I.Hollding to the Albanian government. As for the composition of the goods, it had been changed completely and bore no relation to the first list drawn up by Sh Korbeci. The goods brought by Lev Co were not emergency supplies at all. Regarding this, S.Plaka testified before the State Control that it had caught his attention that the goods were not of an emergency nature, “but there was nothing they could do. These goods were proposed by the Italian side and approved by the Albanian government.” (At a time when the opposite should have happened, ed. note.) Regarding these issues concerning the composition and prices of the goods, F.Nano had been informed by former minister Altin Ylli and by Gvarosh Pogaçe. That F.Nano knew about them is clear, since he wrote on G.Pogaçe’s letter: “Agreed... You follow through on its implementation.” The other issue concerned the medicines. The medicines brought by Lev Co were not in accordance with the list prepared by the Ministry of Health, as specialists would confirm in due course. In response to a question from prosecutor Qeleshi to Qarri, it emerged that, among the other difficulties, 3.7 billion lire worth of aid, mainly medicines, had never arrived in Albania, even though Lev Co had received the money from the Italian government. The documents also showed, Qarri testified, that the transport costs for the ship Gjirokastra, which carried aid, were paid by the Albanian side, even though Lev Co had received the money for this. The same was observed in the handling of the goods. R.Qarri also testified that Lev Co had been paid on the basis of declarations issued by R.Gjini and H.Halko, while the invoices were prepared on the basis of those sent by Lev Co. At the end, the defendants asked their questions, except Nano, who continues to remain silent even as he is being discredited at every moment. After Ridvan Qarri, the witness Shane Korbeci, former Minister of Foreign Trade, was called. How and why were the specialised bodies eliminated? In his account, Sh.Korbeci said that he first heard about the aid in February ’91. At the request of former Foreign Minister R.Malile, Sh. Korbeci drew up the list of necessary goods. Sh. Korbeci then said of Lev Co: “I prepared a draft note,” Korbeci said, “in which I confirmed the goods requested in the fax, but added that Agroeksporti should handle distribution.” Sh.Korbeci was then told that the Ministry of Foreign Trade would not deal with the aid at all, and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would handle it. Shkelqim Cani gave him this answer after consulting with F.Nano. Prosecutor Gjokutaj asked to clarify the fact that Sh.Korbeci had drawn up two lists of goods. The latter replied that he had sent the first list to A.Çarçani, R. Malile and Bujar Kola­neci. Later, “on the instructions of R. Malile,” changes were made and the list was sent to F.Nano, R.Malile and B.Kolaneci. Korbeci further explained that on 7 March ’91 a fax sent by Levante Co was delivered by hand from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announcing the availability of goods such as peas, fruit juices, powdered milk, etc. “According to the instructions,” the Ministry of Foreign Trade was to confirm to the Italian government that it agreed with this list. “We prepared the draft note,” Korbeci said (he was referring to the note mentioned above, ed. note). Korbeci testified further that the Ministry of Trade was then excluded from the aid process because it had asked for Agroeksporti, rather than I.Hollding, to handle distribution. As for the latter, Sh.Korbeci said that he had learned about it from an agreement that this company... Photo: A. Babani

The first witness called by the presiding judge was Ridvan Qarri, an employee of the State Control Commission. Qarri, an employee of the State Control Commission. Qarri recounted the entire history of the violations, from the unlawful procedures followed in selecting Levante Co to the composition of the goods. According to the testimony of R. Qarri, based on documents collected by the State Control team of which he was a member, the Italian government had initially allocated aid of 3 billion lire to Albania, and three goods were designated for inclusion in this aid: wheat, butter and meat. Later, through a fax, Ambassador Dashnor Dervishi was notified to request aid of 30 billion lire “promised” by Grifani in October at a meeting with names such as R. Alia, Sh. Korbeci and Sh. Cani. Who was to distribute the aid? A. Çarçani and Bujar Kolanecit. Later this list was changed. By whom? Who was to distribute the aid? Xh. Pernjola plane. On the basis of a letter from Farudin Hoxha, he presented himself as a partner of Iliria Holding. Whom did Perniola meet? According to R. Malile’s testimony, on 14 February R. Alia called him and said that Levante Co would handle the delivery of the aid and Iliria Holding its distribution. Following this telephone call, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified Ambassador Dervishi in Italy to present the Albanian side’s request to the Italian government, asking that Levante Co handle the delivery of the aid. On 6 March, a fax from Lev. Co arrived at R. Alia’s home. The fax was addressed to Ben Alia, although his position in the government was not known. In this fax, the company Lev. Co stated that “the matter was discussed again with Mr. F. Nano and received a favourable response”. Later it was established that Korbeci but by S. Plaka. It appears that the telegram sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 February did not persuade the Italian government to designate Lev Co as the supplier, so S. Plaka sent the now well-known note stating “the Albanian government’s wish that Lev Co deliver the aid”. It also said that this company had worked in Albania before, had the capacity to adapt quickly and had good relations with Albanian government officials. (It would later be established that nobody knew this company and that it had never worked in Albania, ed. note.) This note, dated 5 March, bears the remark: “Prepared on the instructions of Mr. F. Nano and with the approval of M. Kapllani.” When S. Plaka was asked about this fact by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and again further below and again further below? That F. N. F. Nano knew about it was clear, since he had written on G. Pogaçe’s did not match the list submitted by the Ministry of Health, as specialists from that ministry, such as Vigan Saliasi, etc., attest. Unnecessary medicines were brought at very high prices and in very large quantities, which would result in their expiry in warehouses. For example, 2,500 units of one type of medicine were requested, but over 20,000 arrived. On the basis of these violations, the State Control filed a complaint with the competent authorities. Through his questions, prosecutor Qeleshi confirmed with the witness that it was the note dated 5 March, signed by Sh. Korbeci, that officially sealed Lev Co’s appointment to deliver the aid. It was also verified that, although Lev Co had declared that it had certain goods in stock, they did not arrive R. Malile, Korbeci was then told that he had to change the list, and for this purpose he was sent the fax containing the goods that (I. Hollding) had arranged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Continued on page 4)

-A debt created in the years of communist agony (1988-1991), in order to prolong that failed system’s life, if only a little. THE NIGHT BEFORE LAST IN THE PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY, GOVERNOR VRIONI WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT: -The value and structure of the external debt are: April ’92 = $372.8 million December ’93 = $386 million February ’94 = $384.27 million -Total excluding interest April ’92 = $405.294 million December ’93 = $475 million February ’94 = $480.323 million -Total including interest -Public debt (short-term, medium-term, long-term) = $50 million -70% of the debt is the result of foreign-exchange transactions. -30% of the debt owed to 50 private banks is short-term. The above is the substance of what the Governor of the Bank of Albania, Mr. Dylber Vrioni, who attended the session as Chairman of the Foreign Debt Committee, presented to the People’s Assembly. The numerous questions from MPs Pashko, Imami and Teta are all part of Mr. Vrioni’s ongoing efforts to resolve this issue, with his insistence that the debt, since he took office as Governor, be reduced step by step, and that since its creation through the past years, during his tenure as Chairman of the Government and in the Foreign Ministry, in the Foreign Debt Committee, now this something. And the first results are beginning to show. Thus, with assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, an agreement was reached with the Paris Club to resolve the most difficult issue of public debt, the short-term debt, securing a seven-year deferral period, of which the first three years will be payment-free, while repayment will take place over the following four years. Contacts have also been held with Austrian and German creditors on this issue. Talks and negotiations have also continued with Union Bank of Switzerland, one of the largest creditors in the private debt. It is expected that negotiations will take place between the Albanian Foreign Debt Committee and a committee of 4-5 banks that have expressed themselves (?). And the first results are beginning to show. (Continued on page 4)

-Albanian members of the board give the Italian side the “arguments” for the trial! -The issue must be at the centre of the work of the justice authorities. “Durres Iliria Frashino,” the work of the Nano government The process of opening Albania to the world was also accompanied by many mistakes, from which those who “hunt” for such situations profited. The main characteristic prevailing in 1990-91 was putting oneself (that is, as an Albanian) in the role of the exploited. Established on 28.3.91 under an authorisation signed by Fatos Nano, “Durres Iliria-Fraskino” came into being precisely from an undefined position between that of the ignorant and that of the corrupt. This is because the way the joint-venture contract was drafted was such that it concealed violations of Albanian legislation within it. It was drawn up according to the wishes of the Italian side and in open contradiction to the interests of the Albanian side. What are some of these violations? Among those considered were the designation of the Albanian government as a contracting party, the 99-year term of the contract, the obligation imposed only on the Albanian side to pay a bank guarantee in advance to cover any sanctions imposed by international arbitration, and the arrangement granting the same party the right to assume the attributes of the 50 banks holding this debt. This alternative lawsuit of negotiating through conciliation with foreign negotiators, such as N. Arsidi and the company Sllovun Korposhjen, proved unsuccessful. Thus, the democratic government finds itself facing a difficult problem, decisive for the fate of its economic reform, which is linked to attracting foreign investors to Albania. The latter demand guarantees which, to put it in the language of specialists, are not connected with the amount of ... a stretch 8 km long and 1 km deep, as well as the removal, at the Albanian side’s expense, of the bunkers in this area. Thus, as can be seen from this list of serious defects and major violations, the Albanian side, represented by the then director of NKP Jetgjat Todni, signed a contract imposing obligations on the state that it could in no way fulfil. After the contract was drafted, by 12.11.1991 the Albanian side had made the beach and three infrastructure villas available, while the Italian side had invested only... demonstrated its lack of ability and willingness to comply with its obligations. Unable to meet them, it sought cooperation in Libya and Saudi Arabia. This was not enough for Emin Mysliu, the Construction Minister in the Government of Stability, who signed another contract in Naples to start the works in the name of the Albanian government. The defective manner in which the contract was formulated was not enough; other violations of this contract were also set out in a statement in which they say that responsibility for the failure to start the works rests with the Albanian side. In the report containing “facts” about the obstacles allegedly created, they also mention the Prime Minister and the Construction Minister, on 14.5.1992. The Italian side submitted copies of this report to the International Arbitration Tribunal. It seems, therefore, that we are dealing with a joint venture whose purpose is not investment, but profit through the fostering of disputes. Precisely on the basis of those obligations that the government could not fulfil, but which were stipulated in the contract—such as failure to pay the official guarantee, failure to remove the bunkers from the territory, and the government’s refusal to allow the sale of private property—the Italian side formulated its lawsuit. Not only that, but in response to the Construction Minister’s request of 11.11.1992 to negotiate in light of the economic and political changes, the Italian side insisted on going to International Arbitration. And so, a court case saddled Albania with 40 million dollars. The Italian side managed to benefit. What remains unexplained is whether this outcome was caused by the ignorance of the negotiators who opened the door to it, or by their corruption. In any case, the issue must be at the centre of the activities of the justice authorities. SHPETIM LUKU

CORRUPTION FATOS SELF-ACQUITTALS NANO WITH “CLEAN” HANDS. BEFORE JUSTICE. CARICATURE BY ÇIKLI: “THE MAN WHO TIED HIMSELF UP”. Photo A. Babani CORRUPTION FATOS SELF-ACQUITTALS NANO. WITH “CLEAN” HANDS. BEFORE JUSTICE. CARICATURE BY ÇIKLI: “THE MAN WHO TIED HIMSELF UP”. Photo A. Babani