The democratic government took on the task that, within that same year, 41 foreign decision-making banks also created through the unlawful actions of the communist regime Second: the IMF value for the indicator of the four economic factors. It gave the Albanian government an assessment of the calm of the countries in the region overall, as well as of economic growth. Second: after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the communist system in Albania, a heavy financial burden was inherited from the previous regime. By the end of 1991, external liabilities had reached a very high level and were weighing on the national economy. Based on official figures, the total value of external debt was around 500 million dollars. This included obligations to foreign governments and private creditors. These liabilities had been created by the previous regime through numerous economic and financial agreements. By the end of 1993, the situation changed. The inherited debt was recalculated and determined to have reached around 700 million dollars. This amount included not only the principal, but also accumulated interest and penalties built up over the years. Based on assessments by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Albanian government drew up a special strategy for dealing with this debt. Negotiations were held with creditor governments and banks, with the aim of restructuring and settling the obligations. To implement this strategy, the government set as a priority restoring the confidence of international creditors in Albania. This meant macroeconomic stabilization, curbing inflation, increasing production, and establishing fiscal discipline. In addition to agreements with creditor governments, the government also began talks with foreign commercial banks. Obligations stemming from short-term financing, credit lines, as well as overdue interest, were addressed. A large part of these obligations had arisen from unlawful, abusive, and irresponsible actions by the communist regime. Among them are undelivered supplies, loans inconsistent with their intended purpose, and contracts signed without real economic guarantees. The democratic government undertook to conclude the basic agreements with creditors within a relatively short period of time. This was considered crucial for Albania’s return to the international capital markets and for creating conditions for new investment. It was also intended that debt repayment be carried out without undermining domestic economic reforms, without harming vulnerable social groups, and without hindering the privatization process. The government stressed that the burden inherited from communism could not stand in the way of building a market economy. Within this framework, agreements were reached with 41 foreign decision-making banks. These agreements represented an important step toward normalizing Albania’s financial relations with the world. The negotiation process was accompanied by detailed checks of financial documentation and the identification of responsibility for the creation of the debt. It was emphasized that a substantial part of it stemmed from closed, non-transparent practices outside any public oversight. As a result, dealing with the foreign debt was not merely a financial issue, but also a necessary process for cleansing the heavy legacy of the communist regime and for definitively orienting the country toward the open market economy.

- 151 thousand dollars were transferred to a bank from the account of the KS Solidarity Fund squandered by the PS in the years '91-'92 Scandal Hundreds of thousands of dollars more squandered by PS leaders -151 thousand dollars were transferred to a bank from the account of the KS Solidarity Fund squandered by the PS in the years '91-'92 By BDI LLOGA 400 million Italian lire were deposited in an individual account owned by the first secretary of the Albanian embassy in Rome (?) and the same amount was deposited (the sum is included in the consular account) in the Bank of Naples. According to a report by the High State Control, this is only part of the amount squandered first by the PPSH and later by the PS. Focused on the latest scandal, which is evidenced in the contract for the sale of the PPSH building for the sum of 738 thousand ECU plus its interest, the other actions of the old leadership of the PPSH have been left in the fog. The involvement in this story of the current chairman of the PS and even of two first secretaries of the foreign ministry and our embassy in Rome! kept largely secret, show that the leaders are responsible not only for 738 thousand ECU, but also for 400 million Italian lire. According to the control report of 10 September 1993 by the inspection group on the economic-financial activity of our embassy in Rome, it appears that at the beginning of 1991, considerable sums had been deposited in the bank account in Rome in the name of the Albanian embassy and the consulate, without supporting documentation and without regular institutional approval. A sum of 400 million Italian lire is mentioned, which according to the document was placed in an individual account and part of it in the Bank of Naples. The origin, exact destination and final use of this sum have not been clarified. The suspicions are linked to the fact that these funds may have been part of the assets of the PPSH, later transferred under the administration of the PS. The lack of documentation reinforces suspicions of misuse, diversion of funds and private use of financial means. The report also mentions interference by certain persons in the administration of the accounts and evasion of accounting rules. This makes the case not only political, but also criminal. The documents also speak of other disbursements, including 151 thousand dollars taken from the account of the KS Solidarity Fund and squandered by the PS in the years 1991-1992. According to the accusation, this money did not go to the purposes for which it had been collected. The article also raises questions about the role of the then PS leaders, including the current chairman, as well as the involvement of former diplomatic officials in Rome. The secrecy with which the transactions were carried out is seen as clear proof of a lack of transparency. In conclusion, the case is presented as yet another piece of evidence of the financial abuses linked to the assets of the former PPSH and to the way they were managed in the first years of the Albanian transition. PAGE 5

Mësa e tragjësit in Italy on the anniversary against Majko Shukat-kolori D. Zeneli as a comrade of enterprises in secret Will loyalty that is being squandered by Rusht to take envy recognize Metes?

Interview with President Sali Berisha for the British World Service PAGE 5

By SAMI MILOSHI PAGE 5