Since the communist rebellion until today, creditors have not received a single penny ON PAGE 5

Zani’s gang resumes its activities. 200 thousand dollars for the hostage’s release ON PAGE 2

The District Council and PS officials in Gramsh rob the displaced ON PAGE 4

For the second time within a year, the political head of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Hashim Thaçi, is mentioning the date September 14 in his political vocabulary as a “coup d’état,” and using it as an argument in the internal political rivalries in Kosovo. In fact, apart from the first week after September 14, when some government officials who still wanted to hold on to their seats, as well as the head of the Macedonian army’s secret service, did so, nobody else used this terminology. Now, after almost 9 months, everyone has forgotten this phrase, except Hashim Thaçi, who was not even in power in Albania on September 12, when Azem Hajdari was killed, and who, I believe, is likewise not part of the Macedonian Army Secret Service. So why does September 14 trouble Hashim Thaçi? In Albania’s recent history, September 14 is a troubling day, which has entered the vocabulary of Albanian politics as a synonym for violence used to counterbalance violent politics. In a way, September 14, 1998 linked to September 12, the day when the Albanian government, through a macabre scene, carried out a coup in front of the Democratic Party headquarters in Tirana against the leader of the 1990 student movement and, at the same time, founder of Albania’s first opposition party, Azem Hajdari. His murder was, among other things, the final test put to Albanian society, to determine whether it was ready for another fall to the Albanian communist gangs, as in 1945. Albanian society reacted, and we are all witnesses that for 20 minutes the Albanian prime minister shut the entire cabinet inside his office and left Tirana through the prime minister’s tunnel, ending up in Macedonia. Despite the vulgarity and unpleasant feeling this scene evokes, it was the mechanism that tried to balance the course of history using the same means by which it had been disrupted. After the violent events of 1997, violence began to be considered in Albania, and the Albanian community began to [text unclear] amid an easing of tensions in the square, as well as [text unclear] “had taken up arms and seized power.” The lesson of September 14 finally buried this pride of theirs. What the Albanian communists did for three months with the symbol of the three-finger salute in Vlorë, the rest of society showed it was ready to do in 20 minutes—not to seize power by force, but to humiliate the power of violence and crime in Albania. They understood this well, not only the communists in Tirana, but also their neighbors allied with Albania, and especially the head of the Macedonian army’s secret service, who gained assurance and [text unclear] the Albanian prime minister. But, for all of them, this very man, who commands the Macedonian army’s secret service—which turned out to be a branch of the Yugoslav Army’s paramilitary forces—tried to blame Nano’s departure from power on a man whom nobody in Albania, especially on September 14, had even considered as being involved. This man is called Bujar Bukoshi. The Macedonian army’s secret service, Fatos Nano, and the political leader of the KLA, Hashim Thaçi, all three in unison and of one mind, declared war on the prime minister of Kosovo—not because he had a hand in these events, but simply because he was a new obstacle to their pursuit of a path toward the physical elimination of their opponents. With the elegance of the scene of September 12, official Tirana tried, and succeeded, in making one of its main opponents disappear physically, while on September 14 it used the Albanian revolt to settle accounts with the other opponents still left. Thus, it seems, Nano accused Berisha, while Thaçi, together with the Macedonian secret service, accused Bukoshi, expressing the hope that the scheme would work and they would bring them down. But it is known that the scheme did not work, and after returning from Macedonia, Fatos Nano and the head of KIO left it unfinished and stopped labeling September 14 a coup d’état. For this reason, it seems Hashim Thaçi has no reason to remain worried about September 14. It seems that, more than September 14, he is haunted by the date September 12, just before 9 p.m. that night, when the Albanian secret service’s handheld radio—whose frequencies Hashim Thaçi also used on his handheld radio—was transmitting the scenario for Azem Hajdari’s murder. This night seems to have permanently robbed this man of sleep. Azem Hajdari is the man who first established ties with Kosovo’s fighters; he is the man who remembered and helped Adem Jashari closely and, in another matter, in 1991–1993 in Albania; he is a man who did not speak to Sali Berisha and the DP, felt an affinity for Ibrahim Rugova and made the LDK a second party; he is a man who had not seen Kosovo as a barren, ravaged place full of drug bags, but through the ideals of his political and national movement. (Continued on page 2)

The prime minister officially requests the dismissal of Petro Koçi. The President staunchly defends the Minister of Public Order The DP calls a meeting of its activists in Durrës. Democrats support Rugova as the elected leader of the Albanians. We will win the war when all the displaced return to Kosovo ON PAGE 3

Berisha described as a mistake by the KLA its disregard for the advice of Albania’s friends that a frontal war should not be waged in Kosovo, but rather a guerrilla war that would move step by step toward a general uprising. Berisha said the DP had continually called for the KLA to respect Western standards so that it could become a worthy ally of NATO. Berisha said the DP had called for this continu- friends of the Albanians that a frontal war should not be waged in Kosovo, but rather a guerrilla war that would move step by step toward a general uprising. Berisha said the DP had continually called for the KLA to respect Western standards so that it could become a worthy ally of NATO ON PAGE 3

The conflict between rival factions of the Socialist Party is heading toward an explosion, heralding an internal crisis in the governing coalition that will compound the general crisis of governance. Prime Minister Majko has requested the dismissal of Interior Minister Petro Koçi, and a letter bearing his signature has been on President Meidani’s desk for two days, but the latter appears to have taken the minister’s side. Just one week ago, Majko had promised Minister Koçi his cooperation when the latter resigned last Saturday, and it seemed as though a magic hand had smoothed over the bitter disagreements between the rivals in government. But it seems that the prime minister is now targeting not only the Interior Minister, but President Meidani himself. The left-wing press close to the government said that Majko is prepared to seek a vote of confidence on Meidani if the latter does not sign Koçi’s dismissal. But the prime minister’s offensive in this clan conflict within his own party has now gone to extremes, making this story even more ridiculous; it is a typical example of the lack of seriousness of the people who hold this country’s fate in their hands. This is no occasion to analyze who is right in this baring of teeth, in which the bodyguards’ brawls at the state’s very heart have not been absent either; rather, it is an occasion to look once again at whose hands the Albanians have fallen into at the most inopportune time, when their future is being decided. We now have an Interior Minister who resigned because he could not work in a bodyguards’ government, and then returned to his post, although the government officials—or the chief dependents—who obeyed their guards’ orders remained the same. We also have a prime minister who is being challenged by his own Interior Minister, accusing them all of being the latter’s people; he forced them “to resume cooperation” in the name of “political stability,” and after only three days he is seeking the dismissal of the “enemy,” as though the argument that brought about their temporary reconciliation had vanished in that short time. And finally, we have a president determined to guarantee “unity” among the factions of his party, always supporting whoever he considers his ally—which in this case is Petro Koçi—just as he has done before with the head of state—uf. Fatos Klosi. But whereas a few days ago it seemed that the president, with his “wisdom,” had managed to keep his man in government by making the prime minister sheath his sword, he must now face Majko’s challenge of “either me or Meidani,” which takes the ridiculousness of this gathering of Albanian powerholders to new heights. In fact, this entire conflict, which at first glance gives the impression of personal grudges among three or four powerholders, is a tangled game of major interests, beginning with customs posts and ending with shares in aid tenders, or with shares in the trafficking of goods gathered in Tirana’s important offices. Behind Majko, Koçi and Meidani are mafia pyramids struggling to preserve the influence of their leaders, in a battle far more motivated by this than by personal quarrels or mutual accusations between the prime minister and the Interior Minister. It matters little here what frictions and clashes between Meidani and Koçi make the president so insistent on defending the Interior Minister; what matters is that this government, solely responsible for Albania’s total crisis, is demonstrating that it cannot even maintain normal balances within its own ranks—even when these are divisions over mafia interests. Two days ago, U.S. President Bill Clinton warned in a speech that the West would support only a stable and peaceful government in the post-war Balkans. The statement by the leader of the United States is a clear message to Tirana’s rulers, who have shown from the first day of their return to power that they meet none of Clinton’s conditions. Over the past two years they have given dozens of demonstrations of instability, and the Majko–Koçi conflict, now radicalized into a war between the prime minister and the president, is a typical example of a crisis of power. The left-wing coalition government has presented itself as an executioner in its dealings with the opposition, while showing deference to the aggressor against whom NATO allies have been fighting together for two months. It has been violent and merciless toward the democrats and opposition members in the country, while remaining just as “restrained” in the face of the continuing incursions into northern Albania by Serbian forces. It seems that Clinton’s conditions and the left-wing coalition in Albania have nothing in common, and the crisis of the power “roosters” only underscores the need for rapid political change in the country.

Berisha meets French parliamentarians The chairman of the Democratic Party, Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha, met with the French parliamentary delegation of the Friendship Bureau between the two countries, led by MP Saar and composed of deputies from the governing coalition and the opposition. The French parliamentarians showed interest in Mr. Berisha’s views on developments in the region and the political situation in Albania. At the meeting, Berisha expressed the DP’s support for NATO and its air operations, as well as the necessity of its intervention in Kosovo to bring about Milošević’s capitulation. He told the French parliamentarians that the DP had supported granting NATO airport facilities and all other necessary facilities, and praised and highly valued the role of the French government and its commitment to resolving the Kosovo problem. “It is important,” Berisha stressed, “to reach a final judgment before the war, and for the war to lead to the achievement of this solution. I believe that Kosovo’s independence after a period of protectorate is the solution that will bring peace and stability to the Balkans.” Regarding the situation in the country, Mr. Berisha stressed that in Albania the rule of law had been replaced by clan rule. The judicial system is entirely in the hands of politics. Dangerous criminals are released, while innocent politicians are kept in prison, as in the case of Ekrem Spahia, chairman of the Legality Party, the third-largest party in the country, who faces an absurd charge. The government uses Kosovo and the problems of crimes to suppress the opposition. Nevertheless, Berisha stressed, we are determined to defend the values of democracy. In response to the French parliamentarians’ interest in the DP’s position on parliament and the reasons for that position, Berisha gave a detailed account of all the factors that had compelled the DP to take this action and assured his interlocutors that the DP was open to dialogue, but that it was the governing coalition that had shut the door on dialogue, and that the DP was determined to take positive steps in response to any such steps taken by the government. The French deputies praised Mr. Berisha’s consistent analysis of the situation in the region and in Albania. The conversation was characterized by a spirit of complete understanding.

The government has issued illegal decisions to appropriate aid and revenues from Kosovo Pluralist committees have been sidelined, and the aid is being adminis-tered by the government officials themselves ON PAGE 2

Serbian artillery fires incessantly toward Albanian villages ON PAGE 4

Today, 246 days since the murder of the December Leader Every day that passes since the murder of Azem Hajdari, the symbol of democracy and pluralism, proves the involvement of Fatos Nano’s government and that of his successor in the crime that shook the entire Albanian world. The government of the former communists, who leave free and unpunished the criminals who took the life of the December Leader, shows Albanians that they have been and remain on the side of the murderers, who have names but are untouched by those in power. Democrats and all Albanians who loved and honored Azem Hajdari cannot tolerate this fact under any circumstances. The government must either capture the criminals and bring them to justice, or publicly declare that it itself committed the murder of Azem Hajdari.

Topalli appeals to the Speakers of Europe’s Parliaments ON PAGE 3

If you wish to contribute money for the families held hostage in Kosovo, you can send your contribution to account number 34220/00/0376 at “Dardania Bank,” in the name of the association: “The Children of Kosovo, Our Children.”