THE GJINUSHI–MILO DUO: AN ADVENTURE TOWARD THE FAR LEFT
The PSD’s shift toward the far left and its tumbling into the lap of conservative social communism should be seen not as a hasty move (as we were inclined to call it for a long time), supposedly connected to the moment or to the ego of some leader who stubbornly decided to show that he mattered, but as the product of the Gjinushi–Milo duo.
This 180-degree turn by several PSD leaders toward Enver’s rusted compass and his alternative, now boycotted by our continent (with the exception of Milosheviç), is the product of the duo’s long-standing differences (within this party), amounting to a Machiavellian coup not only against the honest wing that believes in the alternative of European social democracy, but also fundamentally compromising that alternative in the eyes of the Albanian electorate. This headlong slide toward unifying the PSD and PS in ideas, actions and programs, even down to specifying the exact time for leaving Parliament—which was celebrated by the respective parliamentary groups as a great victory in the beach settings of Durrës and Europe—should be seen as the finale of a foretold chronicle. Let us look more closely at this turn toward the far left.
1. First, the Gjinushi–Milo duo nervously produced the idea of early elections. The demand became so dizzyingly excessive that one might think that if elections were held in forty days, they would not only secure a majority in Parliament but also propose the candidate for President, overlooking the concern about the shift toward the far left, which has been marked by the almost intolerable defence they have given precisely to left-wing corruption through the “Alternatives SD.” This advocacy for communist corruption has not only led to distortions in the change of political course, but has also raised questions about why the Gjinushi–Milo duo are so concerned about exposing and punishing this corruption. Are we simply dealing with an instinctive defence of their own kind? (Read: communist substance.) Time will tell.
4. Fourth, this unification of the PSD and PS has resulted not only in the material values enumerated, as mathematics would say, or in their concrete manifestation, as linguists define it, but also in a spiritual, intellectual, propagandistic and journalistic affinity. Specifically, after Gjinushi’s brotherly rapprochement with Nano came the “motorisation” of “Alternativa SD” with “ZP,” explained by the phenomenon of rotationalism, in which the hand influences the mind and vice versa: the PS influenced the PSD. Attacks on the democratic state, the President of the Republic and democratic reform were affected. The same platform was at work in all the communist attacks these two newspapers launched against the Democratic Government—its opening to the world, its peaceful policy in the region, its affirmation of the achievements of the democratic regime and the enhancement of our democratic state’s prestige. This communist-style offensive is so open and aggressive, so full of tones of hatred verging on savagery, that any reader can understand it by reading the pages of these two newspapers. We have only made a brief survey to point out this futile coalition, which ended in the shade of beach umbrellas, calling the Albanian workers’ weekly day off “Communist Saturdays.” Mr Gjinushi, Milo and the other pseudo-social democrats forget that European social democracy has highly praised this decision of the Albanian government, viewing it as a natural development of democracy. But never mind: the apparatchik Gjinushi, in the role of a pseudo-social democrat, has long since translated this theory into European social democracy. Apparently, he has remained faithful to the theory that “a person’s head is filled either with Marxist-Leninist ideology or with bourgeois ideology.” So, by this definition, Gjinushi’s head remains filled with communist ideology.
5. Fifth, it must be said that the PSD’s mournful descent to the end of the far-left road was also made concrete in its position on the national question. While Nano made the shameful declaration with Papandreou, the Albanian question in the Balkans was denied; specifically, the Kosovo and Çam issues were ignored, and a call was made for there to be no intervention in the Balkans to halt the war in Bosnia and its spread across the former Yugoslavia. In reality, this amounted to calling for Millosheviq to be given a free hand to begin the massacre in Kosovo. The PSD is the only party that took no position at all. The Gjinushi–Milo duo never managed to publish even a formal statement, something they had often been accustomed to doing when they were in Parliament; instead, they faithfully stood by their coalition with the PS, namely the orthodox anti-Albanian Serbo-Greek coalition. This coalition is dangerous to peace in the region and has been condemned by the entire democratic world, which has responded forcefully—as shown by the unequivocal statements of the US and NATO, the dispatch of American soldiers to Macedonia, and the firm stance against Greek chauvinism. This fact, too, merits further comment. In any case, we have underlined it only to demonstrate once again the deliberate move of the PSD and Mr Gjinushi toward the far left.
We shall close this note by stressing that it is above all up to the genuine social-democratic forces themselves—who have made and continue to make an undeniable contribution to consolidating democracy, both through parliamentary means in the People’s Assembly and in state institutions at every level—to condemn this adventurist course pursued by certain leaders of their party. It would be a truly great loss for democracy in Albania if the PSD were to lose its colours because of the careerist ambitions of one or two of its leaders.
MUJE BUÇPAPAJ
a great victory in the midst of the beaches of Durrës and there of Europe should be seen as the culmination of a foretold chronicle. Let us examine this turn toward the far left in greater detail.
1. First, the Gjinushi-Milo duo nervously put forward the idea of early elections. The demand was made so absurdly, as though holding elections forty days later would not only secure them a parliamentary majority, but would also let them propose the candidate for President, forgetting, like spoiled children, that on March 22 they had managed to win in only one electoral district. At least Mr. Gjinushi cannot deny that he entered parliament thanks to the help and generosity of the DP and Prof. Berisha, who not only put no opposing candidate against him in his district, but sent the Democratic Party’s leading figures and its best activists to campaign there.
2. Gjinushi knows very well that the Democratic electorate of Peqin did not simply vote for him, since not only did it know him as a minister under Ramiz, as an offspring of the communist bloc, but it also knew very well that he had defended communism until March 31; it knew very well that he had written to the students during the hunger strike, asking them to remove the name of the dictator E. Hoxha, and had insistently urged them, until the morning of February 20, to abandon this demand. This was pressure that could not easily be forgotten. Likewise, the people of Peqin know very well that all of Mr. Gjinushi’s dissent under the communist regime amounts to seven harsh days on his feet, in the period between leaving the post of Minister of Education and Culture and taking up the post of chairman of the PSD. Anyway, that matter belongs to another analysis, perhaps by the PSD itself; but I used this fact to show how baseless the «duo’s» demand for early elections was—a demand that calls to mind the ballad of the ungrateful knight who, after crossing the river, cursed his lord’s horse...
But never mind: the people of Peqin have reminded this duo that the river is quite long, and that the lord is just as long—the Albanian electorate, which does not change in 24 hours, as sons and plant-like parties or trinities of every kind do.
2. Secondly, the extremist duo, in order to cement its alliance with the PS and prove that the coalition with the DP had been a tactic stemming from Stalinist philosophy—which presupposes that communists adapt to certain circumstances (in this case, national democratic opinion) in order to gather strength and strike their opponent at the most dangerous moment and when they are weakest—announced on April 1 that it would leave parliament. And so it indeed happened. This most closely resembled films about the mafia, in which the boss or master, to test the sincerity of his calculating servant, assigns him a dangerous mission, say, an assassination. In our case, the PSD duo carried out a difficult test for their communist masters by staging an attack or provocation against democracy, namely deserting parliament.
3. Thirdly, this alliance of the PSD with the PS and this ...